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BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR:
BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY WITH PRIVACY UNDER
THE USA PATRIOT ACT
PATRICIA MELL t

INTRODUCTION
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound
that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be
picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of
vision which the metal plaque commanded, he would be seen as well
as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment.

-from 1984, by George Orwell, originally published in 1949'

In the futuristic world created by George Orwell, there is no personal privacy. Citizens are watched and tracked every minute of the day
by the government.2 They are told that such surveillance is necessary to
keep them safe from the enemies of the state.3 The citizens are led to
believe that the uncertainties and insecurities of an open democracy warrants protection of their physical security and freedom from military aggression by the ever present and ever watchful eye of Big Brother-the
government.4 In this futuristic world, homogeneity of thought and action
are safe. 5 Divergent views or attitudes are quickly squelched by the government and declared a threat to the security of the state.6 This futuristic
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and Defamation Section, American Association of Law Schools, 2002-2003. The author wishes to
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thanks are extended to Professor Jose Anderson of the University of Baltimore Law School; Remona
Green and Carol Parker, Reference Librarians, Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law;
and Aretha Asamoah, the author's research assistant.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992) (1949).
2. See id. at 3, 26.
3. See id. at 26.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
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world created by George Orwell has been dismissed by some as "science
fiction."7
Advances in computer and surveillance technology, as well as the
growth of Internet use, have combined to make the constant surveillance
of Orwell's novel a possibility. Many street intersections sport video
cameras in the attempt to monitor traffic violators. 8 Thermal imaging 9
and spy satellites make it possible to observe the interior happenings of
the home. Telephone, e-mail, Internet activity, and all other manners of
electronic communication can be monitored.' ° Biometrics methods can
be used to identify and track an individual's movement in society." In
addition, it has been suggested that a National Identification Card be
instituted as a means of monitoring travel patterns.12 Many of these
methods can be used without an individual's knowledge.13 Today's technology has the potential to eliminate the area in which an individual can
legitimately declare privacy from the intrusion of the government. If
allowed to do so, the very fabric of our democratic society will change.

7. In the 1998 movie Enemy of the State, the surveillance techniques of Orwell's world were
shown to be science fact. ENEMY OF THE STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998). In that movie, a
"Winston-like" character, played by Will Smith, discovered how little privacy the individual had at
the hands of unscrupulous government figures. Id.
8. In August 2001, Congress debated the constitutionality of cameras designed to catch
traffic offenders. 2001 Burrelle's Information Services, CBS News Transcripts, CBS Morning News
(CBS television broadcast, Aug. 1, 2001). At that time, only fifty cities in the United States had
installed surveillance cameras at traffic intersections. Id.
9. See id.
10. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act was a 1986 amendment to Title Iii of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which governed wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C. §§
2511-20 (2000). The amendment extended the protections of Title 111to the Internet and other
digital technologies. See id. The following statement appears in the legislative history of the bill:
If Congress does not act to protect the privacy of our citizens, we may see the gradual
erosion of a precious right. Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection,
or it will gradually erode as technology advances. Additional legal protection is necessary
to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment.
Report of the Committee on the Judiciaryon the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-19 (1986).
11. Dana Hawkins, Body of Evidence, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Feb. 18,2002, at 60.
The new technologies establish a person's identity based on distinctive physical features.
Most include a scanner or camera and software for analyzing the images extracting key
features and digitizing the information. The system can then check the digital biometrics
against a database to verify identity. Some features such as the iris are distinctive enough
to allow a system to pick out one person among millions. Others such as hand proportions
are less powerful but still useful for verifying identity.
Id. Each method has benefits and failings. Id. The methods include: digital finger scan, hand scan,
face scan, iris scan, and signature and voice scan. Id.
12. See Mike France et al., Privacy in an Age of Terror,Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 82.
13. See David Banisar, Big Brother Goes High-Tech, COVERT ACTION Q., available at
http:lmediafilter.orglcaq/CAQ56brother.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
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The United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the
right to privacy.' 4 However, the framers of the Constitution created the
Fourth Amendment to be the guardian of American civil liberties.' 5 By
ensuring freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion, the Bill' of
Rights guaranteed core principles.' 6 In combination with the First and
Fifth Amendments, "the Fourth Amendment safeguard[s] not only privacy and protection against self-incrimination, but [also] conscience and
human dignity and freedom of expression as well."' 7 Supported by a
range of procedural and substantive guidelines, the balance was maintained between the government's authority 8to regulate activity and the
individual's freedom of thought and action.
The weakening of the Fourth Amendment threatens these fundamental values. Unfortunately, recent circumstances have made it neces14. In addition to the Fourth Amendment, there are several federal statutes that protect the
privacy of the individual in specific contexts. These include the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a (2000) (giving individuals the right to request access to records about themselves and to
prevent agency disclosure of personal information to third parties without consent); the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (2000) (amending the Privacy Act
to limit the collection of information from individuals and providing guidelines for matching data
about the same individual between agencies); the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa(b) (2000) (establishing guidelines for the police in obtaining information from newspapers);
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (FPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000) (regulating the
manner that the government gains access to bank records about individuals; FPA was amended by
the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505b, 115 Stat.
272, 365 (2001)); the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. §
1232g (2000) (limiting disclosure of student records to third parties without the subject's permission;
FERPA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Stat. 272, 367);
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681v (2000) (limiting the
disclosure of consumer reports, or investigative consumer reports, to third parties (e.g. government
or other users) by consumer reporting agencies; FCRA was also amended by the USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505c, 115 Stat. 272, 365); and the Video Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(2000) (preventing videotape service providers from disclosing personally identifiable information
concerning an individual's tape selection to third parties). For a discussion of these statutes and the
nature of the privacy interests protected, see Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.1 (1996).
15. "Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect 'domestic security."' United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 314
(1972).
16. In this article, privacy will be used to describe freedom from governmental intrusion as
protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. "[T]he Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and
often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
17. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, .J., dissenting). The Court, on
numerous occasions, has recognized the historical interdependence between the rights that are
protected in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482-86
(1965); Marcus v. Search Wan-ants of Property at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S.
717, 724-29 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18. See discussion infra Section L, and text accompanying notes 33-145.
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sary for us as a nation to critically assess our resolve to maintain these
values. On September 11, 2001, we witnessed in horror the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The crash of the plane in
Pennsylvania still causes doubt as to the alleged target. On the ground, in
the air, and in the aftermath of these acts, thousands of people lost their
lives. t9 Along with the loss in human life, this nation lost its sense of
safety and security within its borders.
The government reacted quickly to the crisis with the passage of a
comprehensive act designed to assist law enforcement officials in detecting terrorists. 20 The legislation is known as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act" or "PATRIOT
Act"). 2 ' On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the
PATRIOT Act into law.22
The PATRIOT Act is unprecedented in its amendment to provisions
that had previously checked the ability of the government to observe
everyday activities and obtain personal information about citizens.2 3 The

19. One year after the terrorist attack, the death toll was reported at 2,823. Brian Reade, 9/11:
Stats and Quotes, THE MIRROR, Sept. 11, 2002.
20. The USA PATRIOT Act was passed within seven weeks of the terrorist attacks. Thomas
Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http:thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). On October 2, 2001, the House introduced H.R. 2975, the
Uniting and Strengthening America ("USA Act") Act of 2001. Id. The Senate introduced companion
anti-terrorism legislation on October 4th-S. 1510, the Uniting and Strengthening ("USA Act") Act
of 2001. Id. On October 11th, the Senate passed its anti-terrorism bill, followed by House passage of
its version on October 12th. On October 23rd, H.R. 3162, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA
PATRIOT Act") was introduced in the House, which incorporated provisions of both the House and
Senate passed anti-terrorism bills. Id. On October 24th, the USA PATRIOT ACT passed both houses
of Congress by an overwhelming majority: in the House by a vote of 357-66, and in the Senate by a
vote of 98-1. Id. The President signed it into law two days later on October 26th. Id.
21. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272, 272-75. The 116 pages of the
USA PATRIOT Act are divided into ten sections designated as titles. Each title deals with the
enhancement of a different set of criminal and civil law enforcement. Title I - Enhancing Domestic
Security Against Terrorism; Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures; Title III - International
Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001; Title IV - Protecting the
Border; Title V - Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism; Title VI - Providing for Victims
of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Their Families; Title VII - Increased Information Sharing
for Critical Infrastructure Protection; Title VIII - Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against
Terrorism; Title IX - Improved Intelligence; Title X - Miscellaneous. Despite its title, several of the
provisions of the Act are not restricted to curtailing terrorism. Instead, many provisions are
permanent changes to the criminal justice system in the United States. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 371c, 115 Stat. 272, 337 (creating a criminal offense called "bulk cash
smuggling").
22. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
23. The USA PATRIOT Act does make some changes needed to keep law enforcement
techniques current with changes in technology; however, these changes have little to do with
terrorism. See id. § 816, 115 Stat. 272, 385 (establishing cybersecurity forensic training for law
enforcement).
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fact that it does so in such a potentially oppressive manner has not quite
hit the consciousness of the American people.24 Privacy, in the sense of
freedom from governmental intrusion, is a necessary foundation for the
free exercise of democracy. However, privacy remains an abstract concept for the majority of Americans.25
By contrast, the horror of watching airplanes ramming into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon was concrete. Thus, Americans
perceived that drastic measures were needed to prevent new attacks and
restore the sense of security rocked by September 11 th. The government
responded to this perceived need with the PATRIOT Act."
The PATRIOT Act attacks the balance between the government and
the individual by a systematic circumvention of established doctrine and
procedures guarding against unreasonable governmental intrusion. 27 It
expands the realm of foreign surveillance into the domestic arena. 28 It
removes many instances of judicial oversight from the system and threatens basic notions of freedom. It supersedes federal privacy protection
laws and creates new crimes that may impact the Bill of Rights.29 In
many ways, it has repealed traditional notions of checks and balances
between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government. 30 This new standard of executive branch license, combined with a

24. Several of the provisions of the Act were challenged by a coalition of right and left wing
Congressmen and special interest groups. Attorney General Ashcroft derided them in his testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001. Dep't of Justice Oversight: Preserving
our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States).
He stated, "to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They
give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's friends." Id. The statement has the
unfortunate effect of giving credence to civil libertarians who value free speech.
25. Members of various minority groups may disagree, pointing to obsessive use of police
power in such things as traffic stops on less than probable cause, i.e. "driving while black." See
Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW AND PSYCHOL. REV.
127 (2000). Even in these instances, however, there are procedures that redress the government's
abuses. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (granting a motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stops of seventeen African-American males stopped
for minor traffic offenses; the court found prima facie evidence of racial discrimination on the part of
the state police).
26. The stated purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act is "[tlo deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes." USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (introductory text).
27. See generally USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
28. See discussion infra note 32 on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
29. See id.
30. Although expressing some reservations, the pressing nature of the terrorist attacks may
have made some members of Congress less willing to object to some of the provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) was heard to complain that by naming the bill the
USA PATRIOT Act, members of Congress were being subtly coerced into voting for it or risk being
branded unpatriotic. Heather Forsgren Weaver, Balance Sways Between Privacy, Security Concerns,
RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Feb. 4, 2002, availableat http://rcrnews.com/cgi-bin/search.pl.
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Fourth Amendment weakened by advances in surveillance technology,
could extinguish privacy under the Fourth Amendment and dramatically
change the nation.3 1
This article is an assessment of some provisions of the PATRIOT
Act and its severe retrenchment of the privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment. It reviews some of the established protections that balanced
the government's ability to intrude into the individual's sphere of privacy. This article also compares the traditional distinctions made between the heightened privacy protection standard under the Fourth
Amendment for domestic criminal investigations with the lowered standards accepted for investigations performed for the collection of foreign
intelligence under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
which figures so prominently in the PATRIOT Act. 32 Finally, this article
examines some provisions of the PATRIOT Act as they impact these
privacy protections.
I. THE PRE-PATRIOT ACT SCHEME OF CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS PROTECTION OF PRIVACY

A. The Legitimacy of the Individual's Subjective Expectation of Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supthe place
ported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing
33
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

While the Constitution does not specifically designate a right to privacy, the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment has been to "safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by

31. See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). A warning concerning the
effects of technology on the Fourth Amendment was given in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 465-66 (1928).
32. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") was enacted to provide guidelines to
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") for the collection of intelligence on the activities of foreign
powers. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000). FISA was the Congressional response to a Senate report
documenting the flagrant unconstitutional surveillance perpetrated by governmental agencies on
domestic organizations critical to the administration. See discussion on Church Committee Report,
infra note 284. Before its amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA allowed surveillance
pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause that the purpose of the surveillance was the gathering
of foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-05. There were very narrowly proscribed
circumstances for domestic surveillance. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971 (2001). Special courts were established to hear applications
for FISA surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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governmental officials." 34 It has balanced the government's exercise of
its police power with the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
intrusions by the government. 35 The Fourth Amendment did not abolish
the government's power to conduct searches of private residences or to
seize papers found within. Instead, it imposed a reasonableness requirement upon governmental searches.36 Requiring a warrant, as a condition
precedent to a search, added judicial supervision to the government's
37
exercise of its prerogative to intrude into the individual's private areas.
The probable cause standard gave judges a measure by which to decide
the appropriateness of the warrant and provided additional insurance that
groundless searches would not be allowed.3 8
The framers of the Constitution took great pains to provide a system
of checks against governmental action because of their own experiences
with the unreasonable and arbitrary searches performed by the English
colonial government's officials. 39 Through the writ of a general warrant
and writs of assistance, the English government had the power to search
n The use and abuse of such writs by the English
anyplace for any thing.4
militia in colonial America was at the basis of the Fourth Amendment's
broad grant of protection to the people.4'
Both the warrant clause and reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment acted as buffers between the government and the individual.42 However, the Framers did not mean for the individual's privacy to
be absolute. 43 The individual's private realm would suffer shifting bor-

34. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See supra note 14 for a list of some of
the federal statutory protections afforded to individuals.
35. "The Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into the
privacies of life." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 332 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
36. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
37. The requirement that the warrant be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate has its
basis in English common law. "[W]here practical, a governmental search and seizure should
represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the
magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises
or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 'neutral and detached
magistrate."' U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 316.
38.

See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94, 95 n.61 (1937).
39. In Colonial America, the British would search the colonists' homes for evidence of
contraband and treason against the crown. See generally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1st ed. 1978).
40. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1886).
41. See LASSON, supra note 38, at 80; see also Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1034 (1765) (describing the search of plaintiff's house under a general warrant).
42. See LAFAVE, supra note 39, §§ 1.1, 3.1 for a discussion on the operation of these clauses
of the Fourth Amendment.
43. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. It was later suggested that the states might be better able to
develop more expansive protections of individual privacy. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1977) ("State
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ders as the courts reinterpreted the permissible sphere of privacy before
society's varying needs. Advances in technology combined to shrink the
shield of the Fourth Amendment as a protector of privacy. With each
advance in surveillance technology, the Supreme Court adjusted its
analysis to reflect what it considered to be the legitimate sphere of privacy acceptable to society. 44 Determining the appropriate balance between the individual's privacy and the government's power to intrude
upon said privacy is one of the most litigated concepts under the Constitution.4 5
B. Surveillance and FourthAmendment ProtectionBefore the PATRIOT
Act
Boyd v. United States46 was the first case to assess the modern parameters of the Fourth Amendment. It reflected the nineteenth century
notion of a very broad sphere of personal privacy.47 The United States
Supreme Court held the manner of intrusion to be irrelevant to the privacy being protected.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property,. . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and

constitutes the essence of [the Fourth Amendment] .48

constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those
required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed."); cf Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (upholding a warrantless search by a city building inspector
acting under a city ordinance); Tracey Maclin, ConstructingFourth Amendment Principlesfrom the
Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 720, 726
(1988) (discussing whether a warrant requirement would impair the state's "special interests" by
interfering with the state's probation system).
44. A thorough review of the changing analysis of Fourth Amendment cases by the Supreme
Court is beyond the scope of this article. For that review, see Nadine Strossen, The Fourth
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76; Silas J. Wassertrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988).
45. "[lIt is beyond question that the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of more litigation
than any other provision in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, I would be willing to wager ... that...
lawyers and judges have spilled more words over the Fourth Amendment than all of the rest of the
Bill of Rights taken together." LAFAVE, supra note 39, at v; see also Jeffrey J. Skelton, Infrared
Imaging Technology: Threatening to See Through the Fourth Amendment, 29 IND. L. REV. 231, 234
n.23 (1995).
46. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
47. See LASSON, supra note 38, at 107-10.
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
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Boyd also fixed the outer perimeter of modem Fourth Amendment analysis.49 It established the principle that the Fourth Amendment applied to
"all invasions on the part of the government and its employees [and was
not limited to] a man's home, [but encompassed all the] privacies of
life." 50 It is not surprising that the broad scope of Fourth Amendment
protection granted in Boyd was to be restricted in the face of the problems of fighting crime. 5'
Olmstead v. United States52 was a severe retrenchment of privacy
protection under the Fourth Amendment. The case ushered in a balancing
approach of individual privacy versus society's need to fight crime using
the new technology of wiretaps. 53 In Olmstead, the majority determined
that the Fourth Amendment protection against governmental intrusion
could only be based upon a physical intrusion into the allegedly private
space and applied to "material things - the person, the house, his papers,
or his effects. 54 Since the wiretap and "capture" of the telephone conversations were not physical evidence, "[t]here was no searching[,]
[t]here was no seizure... , [t]here was no entry of the houses or offices
of the defendants., 55 Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to government wiretaps.
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis predicted the wave of technological
advancement and its encroachment upon the individual's right to privacy. 56 As one of the first defenders of the right to privacy, Brandeis
viewed the Fourth Amendment as giving citizens protection against

49. See id. at 622-38; see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (holding that
evidence of unlawful seizure is not admissible); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, 311-12
(1921) (holding that property seizure in a lawful manner may be admissible); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (concluding that evidence obtained in an improper
way is not admissible and shall not be used); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914)
(holding that the trial court erred in admitting and using evidence that was illegally obtained by a
United States marshal).
50. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
51. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Present and Future Fourth Amendment, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 111 (1995) (discussing judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the United
States Supreme Court); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1977) (analyzing the broad shifts
in legal thought affecting the United States Supreme Court's view on individual rights and how
those shifts have affected the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); The Life and Times of Boyd v. United
States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977-78) (discussing changing societal and judicial
notions of property and privacy since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Boyd).
52. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
53. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 464-71.
54. Id. at 464.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible
for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure
in court of what is whispered in the closet.").
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In delivering the majority opinion in Olmstead, Justice Taft was not
without concern for the protection of the individual's privacy in the face
of government surveillance.5 8 He suggested that the lack of Fourth
Amendment protection could be remedied by legislative enactment.5 9
Congress
responded with the enactment of the Federal Communications
60
Act.
In the years after Olmstead, the privacy protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment continued to narrow. In the 1940s and 1950s, the
Supreme Court maintained its restrictive application of Fourth Amendment protection to telephone wiretapping6 1 and declined to apply it to a
variety of types of government surveillance activities based solely on the
lack of a physical intrusion into the area sought to be held private. 62 This
physical presence requirement promulgated by the Court and integrated
into its Fourth63 Amendment jurisprudence was laid to rest in Katz v.
United States.
Katz is important on a number of fronts. Most importantly, it
changed the nature of Fourth Amendment analysis from a trespass model
to one based on the protection of people, not places.6 In Katz, the defendant was under investigation for violations of a federal statute that pro-

57. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brandeis was the co-author of one of the first
studies of privacy in the modem age. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1890).
58. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66.
59. Id.
60. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act, formerly Title VI, § 605, 48
Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1969)). Currently, section 605 reads in pertinent
part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person .. . .No person having received any
intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
knowing that such communication was intercepted shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part
thereof), or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
61. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1942).
62. See id.; see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (finding
listening device implanted into a party-wall did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1961) (holding § 605 of the Federal Communications Act
inapplicable to conversations heard by virtue of a foot long spike mike); Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 749, 751 (1952) (holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to conversation from wire
placed on the body of an individual).
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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hibited knowingly transmitting wagering information in interstate commerce, a domestic crime. 65 A creature of habit, the defendant tended to
use a particular public telephone booth to place calls.6 6 The police correctly anticipated that the defendant would use the same telephone on a
particular day and at a particular time.67 The government attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone
booth, allowing agents to monitor and record the defendant's half of several conversations.6 s These conversations confirmed that he was taking
and placing illegal wagers from the telephone.69 Over the defendant's
objection, the government introduced evidence of the telephone conversations at trial.7 °
The government's argument to admit the conversations was based
on the trespass model of Fourth Amendment analysis.7 1 Pursuant to this
view, the interception of the conversation did not constitute a search
since a search could only occur if there had been a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area.72 If the Court followed precedent and
accepted the government's argument, then the surveillance would have
successfully met the constitutional challenge. 73 Instead, the Court repudiated that view and held that the defendant had a justifiable expectation of
privacy while using the telephone booth.74 Consequently, the interception
of the conversation constituted a search and seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment and the evidence should be suppressed.75
In reaching its determination, the Court returned to the broad, general scope of Fourth Amendment protection developed in Boyd. According to the Court,
[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
in an area accessible to the public, may be
preserve as private, even 76
constitutionally protected.

65. Id. at 354.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 352-53.
72. Id. at 353.
73. Id. at 352-53 (citing Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-36 (1942); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464,
466).
74. Id. at 353 ("We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling.").
75. See id. at 359.
76. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
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This broader view of privacy did not make the Fourth Amendment into a
general constitutional right of privacy.77 It did, however, reestablish the
Fourth Amendment as the individual's guardian against unreasonable
government intrusion.
By itself, the majority opinion changed the direction of Fourth
Amendment analysis, but it is for Justice Harlan's concurrence that Katz
is best known. 78 Justice Harlan established the current two-step analysis
of Fourth Amendment issues.79 Under this model, the subject of the
search must first have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, the individual's expectation of privacy must be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable., 80 The benchmark of
the protection became the sphere of privacy recognized by society as
being legitimate under the circumstances. 8' Since Katz, the bifurcated
inquiry has been 82used with each new technological advance in surveillance techniques.
A less familiar part of the Katz decision foreshadows issues that
may arise concerning the government's use of its expanded surveillance
powers under the PATRIOT Act-the warrant requirement. After determining that the Fourth Amendment applied to the facts presented in Katz,
the Court's final issue was whether the search and seizure conducted by
the government, without a warrant, complied with constitutional standards.83 Since the surveillance was conducted without a warrant, it either
had to fit one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement or be adjudged unreasonable. 84 The government tried to establish the reasonableness of its surveillance and described the actions of its agents as being
very limited in both scope and duration.85 In fact, on the one occasion

77. Id. at 350.
78. See id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
82. The Fourth Amendment has been held to cover searches other than those of homes.
Among the government actions deemed to constitute a Fourth Amendment search are: searches
conducted of cars, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), telephones through the use of
listening devices, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), and other electronic means such
as pen registers, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979), electronic monitoring devices,
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1985), aerial surveillance, Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986), and thermal imaging devices, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34-35 (2001). However, the subject of the search was not always successful in asserting Fourth
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46; Karo, 468
U.S. at 706; and Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59.
84. See id. at 357 & n.19 ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
85. See id.
at 354.
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that the agents intercepted the statements
of another person, "the agents
86
refrained from listening to them.,
Rather than grant the retroactive validity requested by the government, the Court recognized that the facts supported the conclusion that
had a warrant been applied for, it could have been granted by a duly authorized magistrate.87 The Court decided that a judicial order could have
accommodated the legitimate needs of law enforcement by authorizing
the carefully limited use of surveillance. Such an order would have protected the individual's privacy by allowing "no greater invasion of privacy than was necessary under the circumstances. 8
While recognizing that the essence of electronic surveillance rested
on a lack of notice to the subject under investigation, the Court refused to
create an exception to the warrant requirement for the police.89
Omission of such authorization 'bypasses the safeguards provided by
an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after the event justification
for the

. . .

search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar

shortcomings of hindsight judgment.' And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from
9
Fourth Amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the police.' 0
Notwithstanding the limited nature of the search conducted by the officials in Katz, the Court decided that by pursuing the wiretap without first
securing a warrant, the government had "ignored the procedure of antecedent justification.., that is central to the Fourth Amendment, a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case." 9'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has recognized instances in which
a warrant is not a necessary condition precedent to a valid domestic

[The agents] did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the
petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other states in violation of
federal law ....
The agents confined their surveillance to brief periods during which he
used the telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of
the petitioner himself.
Id.
86. Id. at 354 n. 15.
87. Id. at 356-57.
88. Id. at 355-56 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967)). In an earlier case, the
Court had held that an "order authorizing the use of the electronic device in Osborn afforded similar
protections to those of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence." Id. at
355-56 (citing Berger, 388 U.S. at 57) (internal quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 358.
90. Id. at 358-59 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379'U.S. 89, 95, 97 (1964)).
91. Id. at 359; see also discussion infra Section I. and notes 246-403, concerning warrant
requirements and surveillance done for the protection of national security.
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search. 92 The circumstances include searches incident to arrest, 93 "stop

and frisk" searches, 94 automobile searches, 95 searches at immigration
ports of entry to the United States,96 and searches of closed containers in
automobiles that have been lawfully stopped.97
Since Katz, the Court has been consistent in holding that if the government intrusion is a search, the person invoking the protection of the
Fourth Amendment will only be successful if he can claim a legitimate
98
and justifiable expectation of privacy from the government's intrusion.
As opposed to this precept lending strength to privacy protection under
the Fourth Amendment, subsequent cases would constrict the situations
in which a justifiable expectation of privacy is found. 99 In many of these

92. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (extending the automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to closed containers found in lawfully stopped and
searched vehicles); see also Lewis R. Katz, Criminal Law: United States v. Ross: Evolving
Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172 (1983) (examining
implications to areas relating to the Fourth Amendment after the Supreme Court's decision in Ross).
93. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."); Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (holding that where police in the course of station-house questioning took
samples from the respondent's fingernails there was not an improper search under the Fourth
Amendment); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (explaining exigent circumstances);
see generally Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (expanding police authority to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles carrying contained containers); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759, 762-63 (1969)
(discussing that searches incident to arrest are limited and, when at all possible, police must attempt
to obtain judicial approval through warrant procedure).
94. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-31 (1968) (discussing that police officer's conduct of
stop and frisk cannot automatically be considered outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment, but
rather must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard).
95. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); see also Carroll,267 U.S. at 147-49, 15153 (establishing that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile may be
searched without a search warrant).
96. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (discussing searches upon entering
the United States); see also United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussing searches upon leaving the United States).
97. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 798 (finding a warrantless search of closed containers in
automobiles valid); see also Katz, supra note 92, at 172 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court extended the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to closed containers found in
lawfully stopped and searched vehicles.").
98. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding an automobile has a different
expectation of privacy than a dwelling); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (ruling the
Fourth Amendment protects people from government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (explaining that a court will examine
documents to.see if contents were within defendant's expectation of privacy); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding compelled execution of voice and handwriting samples not
to be within defendant's expectation of privacy); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973) (ruling no expectation of protected privacy in situation where an accountant is obligated to
disclose information); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 ("[W]here an individual may harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.").
99. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (allowing use of sense-enhancing technology in use generally by
the public); Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding an unmonitored beeper to not violate anyone's privacy
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cases, the governmental intrusion was aided by enhanced surveillance
technology. °° With each new surveillance technique, the Supreme Court
attempted to refine the notion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. ' As, a result, the parameters of privacy rights that may be protected are in flux. The fluidity of this situation makes the warrant requirement a lynchpin for the protection of privacy.
1. Thermal Imaging' °2
In most cases addressing the use of a "new technology" by law enforcement officers to conduct a search, courts have to consider the question of whether use of the new technology constitutes a search. Initially,
the determination of whether the electronic surveillance can be characterized as being a search depends on whether the technology is intrusive
into the target area. 10 3 If the method is not intrusive, it is not a search
requiring the protection of the Fourth Amendment and the failure to obtain a warrant will not defeat the use of the evidence found in the target
area. 104
In United States v. Penny-Feeney,0 5 for instance, a "non-intrusive"
Forward Looking Infrared Device ("FLIR") was used in a fly-over of a
suspect's residence. 10 6 An officer used a FLIR to detect the existence of
surface waste heat, which can be the incidental by-product of energy
sources used to cultivate marijuana. 0 7 Based on the results from the
FLIR flyover, police obtained a search warrant for the defendants' residence. 0 8 In the search, they discovered evidence of marijuana production. 1 9 In denying the defendants' motion to suppress, the district court
held that the defendants did not manifest an actual expectation of privacy

interests); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (ruling people have no reasonable expectation of privacy when
dialing phone numbers); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991)
(finding no expectation of privacy in heat voluntarily vented from garage).
100. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 (using a thermal imaging device to detect heat from heat
lamps used to grow marijuana).
101. See id. at 34 (allowing use of sense-enhancing technology in use generally by the public);
Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding an unmonitored beeper to not violate anyone's privacy interests);
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (ruling people have no reasonable expectation of privacy when dialing phone
numbers); Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (finding no expectation of privacy in heat voluntarily
vented from garage).
102. "Thermal imaging is a passive, non-intrusive instrument which detects differences in
temperature on the surface of objects being observed. It does not send any beams of rays into the
area on which it is fixed or in any way penetrate structures within that area." Penny-Feeney, 773 F.
Supp. at 223.
103. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463-64.
104. See id. at 464-65.
105. 773 F. Supp. 220.
106. Id. at 223-24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 224.
109. Id.
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in the heat waste since they voluntarily vented it outside the garage
where it would be exposed to the public and in no way attempted to impede its escape or exercise dominion over it. 1° Likening the heat waste
to garbage left on the street, the district court made it clear that even if
the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not one
that society was prepared to recognize as legitimate."'
Considering the validity of warrantless thermal imaging surveillance
in Kyllo v. United States,"2 the Court determined that the use of senseenhancing technology to gather any information regarding the interior of
a home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas constituted a search." 13 The
lower courts had held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy
"because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his
home.... [E]ven if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager did not expose any intimate details of
Kyllo's life, only amorphous hotspots on the roof and exterior wall. ' " 4
However, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal imaging to
measure heat emanating from a home was a search, at least where the
technology in question was not in general public use." 5 As such, the
search was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
In making its decision, the Court tried to preserve some measure of
privacy against governmental intrusion that existed at the inception of the
Fourth Amendment in the eighteenth century. 116 When promulgated, the
Fourth Amendment protected the interior of the home.' 7 Using that basis, the Court secured for the home a minimal and reasonable expectation
of privacy."18
To withdraw protection of this minimal expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. [Thus,] obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any

110. Id.at 226.
11. See id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1987)).
112. 533 U.S. 27. Kyllo's facts are substantially similar to those of Peeny-Feeney. In Kyllo, the
police suspected that the target was growing marijuana in his home and used a thermal imaging
device to determine if the heat emanating from it was consistent with that which would be created by
the high energy lamps required for marijuana growth. Id. at 29. The scan did show significantly
higher heat emanations coming from the target's home as compared to those of his neighbors. Id. at
30. Based in part on the thermal imaging, a judge issued a search warrant for Kyllo's home where
agents found marijuana growing. Id. Kyllo was indicted on federal drug charges and moved,
unsuccessfully, to suppress the seized evidence. Id. at 29-30.
113.
Id. at 40.
114. Id. at 31.
115.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search--at least where . . . the
technology in question is not in general public use.l9

2. Electronic Beepers

120

In United States v. Karo,121 the police 'bugged' a can of ether with
an electronic beeper and monitored its movement through a series 1of
22
private houses and privately rented storage facilities without a warrant.
Using evidence from both the beeper and actual observation of sites, the
police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the target's premises
and found cocaine, allowing the suspects to be arrested. 23 The district
court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the seized evidence,
124
charging that the initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid.
This
25
seizure.1
resulting
the
illegal conduct by the government tainted
The Supreme Court decided that the original installation of the
beeper did not violate anyone's Fourth Amendment rights,
but cautioned
126
against the use of such techniques without a warrant.
Despite this holding, warrants for the installation and monitoring of a
beeper will obviously be desirable since it may be useful, even critical, to monitor the beeper to determine that it is actually located in a
place not open to visual surveillance.... [S]uch
monitoring without a
27
warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment.1

The Court then addressed the privacy concerns raised by the monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence in a location not open to visual surveillance. 128 The Court determined this to be a violation of the justifiable

119. Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
120. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that
can be picked up by a radio receiver." Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.l (citing United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 277 (1983)).
121. 468 U.S. 705. Karo is distinguishable from Knotts by the fact that although a beeper had
been placed in a 5-gallon can of chloroform, the movements of the car and the arrival of the can at
the cabin could have been observed by the naked eye. Id. at 707. As such, no Fourth Amendment
violation was committed by monitoring the beeper during the trip to the cabin. Id.
122. Id. at 708. Through an informant, police learned that the targets had bought a number of
canisters of ether from an informant. Id. The ether was to be used to remove cocaine from clothing.
Id.
123. Id.at710.
124. Id.
125. Id. The government appealed and the decision was affirmed on slightly different grounds
by the court of appeals. Id.
126. Id. at 713. There was no violation because the informant who consented to the addition of
the beeper owned the ether cans. Id. at 711.
127. Id. at 713 n.3.
128. Id. at 714.

392

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:2

interest in privacy held by the members of the residence. 129 "Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."' 130 Despite
this, the monitoring of the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of
the rented locker where the ether was stored and, as such, the use of the
beeper was not a search of the locker. 13' The specific locker containing
the ether was detected by its distinctive smell, 32 and the police subsequently observed the can of ether being moved from that locker to the
home. 33 All of these activities were in plain view and constituted no
134
Fourth Amendment violations.
As such, the Court reversed the sup35
1
evidence.
the
of
pression
3. Aerial Surveillance
The Court has not been willing to extend the individual's legitimate
sphere of privacy beyond the confines of the home to include the home's
backyard. 136 In Californiav. Ciraolo,137 the Court determined that a naked eye police inspection of an individual's backyard from a fixed wing
aircraft at one thousand feet was not a search. 138 Even though the area
was within the curtilage of the home, that fact alone did not bar police
observation. 139 Likewise, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States,140
the Supreme Court held that the use of aerial photography to conduct a
site inspection under the
Clean Air Act was not a search for Fourth
4
Amendment purposes.'
As a result of these cases, the individual's sphere of protection from
unreasonable governmental intrusion has been progressively whittled

129. Id.
130. Id. at716.
131. Id. at 720.
132. Id. at720-21.
133. Id. at721.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
137. 476 U.S. 207.
138. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239); see also Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding that aerial surveillance from a helicopter in public
navigable airspace was non-intrusive and did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
139. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83
(1984).
140. 476 U.S. 227.
141. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239. The intimate activities associated with family privacy
and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures
and buildings of a manufacturing plant. Id. For purposes of aerial surveillance, the open area of an
industrial complex is more comparable to an "open field" in which an individual may not
legitimately demand privacy. id.
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away. 142 It has been diminished even under circumstances in which the
subject of the surveillance took steps to secure the area from prying eyes
and in situations in which the government used increasingly circumspect
methods of surveillance.14 3 The juggling of the sphere's parameters has
resulted in uncertain standards for the individual's privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. 144
While it may not be clear what the parameters are, the Supreme
Court has attempted to fashion protections based upon its sense of the
framers' intent. However, the PATRIOT Act has redrawn the lines of the
individual's privacy by expanding the type of information susceptible to
government acquisition. 145 This expansion reduces the realm in which the
individual can have an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, which impacts other civil liberties.
II. RESTRICTION OF THE LEGITIMATE SPHERE OF PRIVACY BY THE
PATRIOT ACT'S AMENDMENT OF PRIVACY PROTECTION LAWS

A. Disclosureof Sensitive Information Under the PATRIOT Act
Current laws shape the parameters of the individual's sphere of privacy by declaring that certain information is not to be disclosed to third
parties, including the government, except under specified extraordinary
circumstances. 146 The PATRIOT Act makes the disclosure of highly sensitive information routine between a large number of law enforcement
agencies and other government personnel. 147 The broad dissemination of
information collected for different reasons, some under standards requiring much less than probable cause, could negatively impact the individual's ability to exercise guaranteed civil liberties.
Provisions of the PATRIOT Act eliminate prevailing privacy pro48
tection laws, further diminishing the individual's sphere of privacy.1
Section 505 of the Act amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act,149 the Financial Right to Privacy Act, 50 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 151 to allow government access to personal information upon
142.

See LaFave, supra note 51, at 121.

143. Seeid. at 112-14.
144. Id. at 121. Furthermore, none of the aerial surveillance cases dealt with the propriety of
spy satellite surveillance that would be possible for regular law enforcement through the expansion
of CIA authority under FISA. Id. at 113.
145. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365-66 (2001).
146. See supra note 14 for a list of federal statutes limiting the disclosure of personal
information.
147. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504, 115 Stat. 272, 364.
148. See, e.g., id. § 217, 115 Stat. 272, 291 ("Interception of Computer Trespasser
Communications").
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (2000).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2000).
151.
18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2000).
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"certification" by an FBI agent that the records are relevant to "an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."1 52 Before the amendment, each of those sections specifically provided government access to the records but, in addition to
relevance, also required the government to show that the target of the
investigation was "an agent of a foreign power."'' 53 Section 505 removes
the "agent of a foreign power" requirement, and as such, greatly expands
government access to a multitude of private records without significant
judicial review. 54 In combination with the government's newly enlarged
domestic surveillance powers under FISA, Section 505 gives the gov1 55
ernment unprecedented ability to compile dossiers on private citizens.
In addition to the amendment of these three privacy statutes, the
PATRIOT Act also amends the Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act ("FERPA") 5 6 to allow nonconsensual disclosure of student records. 57 FERPA previously limited the disclosure of student records to
third parties without the consent of the student or parents. 58 Section 507
amends FERPA to permit access to these educational records in the in59
vestigation of domestic or international terrorism, or national security. 1
To secure these records, the government only has to certify that the records are relevant to such an investigation. 60 The application is heard ex
parte, which precludes the target from contesting disclosure of the information.' 6' There is no meaningful review by a court, since the court
must issue the order as long as the application contains the certification. 62 Section 507 does say that an investigation of a "United States
person" may not be pursued "solely on the basis of activities protected by
the First Amendment," but such a statement is not required to be in the
certification to the court.1 63 Without meaningful judicial oversight, this
provision could be used to chill First Amendment speech.

152. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365.
153. Id. §§ 505(a)(2), 505(b), 505(c), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681u, 12 U.S.C. §
3414(a)(5)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)).
154.

Id.

155. See id.
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
157. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Stat. 272, 368 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1232g).
158. 20 U.S.C § 1232g(a)(l). The records protected include information concerning both
students' and parents' finances, confidential letters of recommendation, and students' educational
records, including records of students in primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational
programs. Id.
159. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Stat. 272, 367.
160.

See id.

161.
162.
163.

See id.
See id.
See id. § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365.

20021

BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR

In several sections, the PATRIOT Act expands the scope of information subject to disclosure to the government. 64 In many instances,
these invasions of the individual's privacy are not subject to judicial review.165
B. Expanded Scope of Subpoenasfor Records of Electronic Communications
Section 2703 of Title 18 of the United States Code governs law enforcement's access to records concerning electronic communications
services.' 66 Under a prior subsection of this provision, a service provider
was required to disclose to a government entity "the name, address, local
and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or
other subscriber number or identity and length of service of a subscriber
and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized., 167 Section
210 of the PATRIOT Act removes access to the "the types of services
the subscriber utilized," but expands the type of information that a provider must disclose to include "records of sessions times and durations,"
"any temporarily assigned network address," and any means or source of
payment, "including any credit card or bank account number."' 168 As opposed to narrowing the scope of information subject to disclosure, the
new categories potentially expose more personal information about the
target than was previously available. 69 This could have a negative impact on the privacy of all subscribers since it applies to all government
70
investigations, not just investigations of suspected terrorist activity.
The potentially negative impact on privacy is compounded by the fact
that this broader range of information is available to the government
merely through the use of a subpoena.1 71
The PATRIOT Act's reduction of the individual's sphere of privacy
makes the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause even more
important to the'protection of the individual's privacy. Any enactment
that increases the scope of information subject to government access, but
which reduces judicial oversight of the government's efforts at collection, depresses privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment even
further. Several provisions of the PATRIOT Act have that effect by allowing electronic surveillance to be performed by law enforcement

164. See id. §§ 505, 507, 115 Stat. 272, 365, 367.
165. See id.
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (approved Oct. 21, 2002).
167. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(2)).
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(B)(i); see also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 210,
115 Stat. 272, 283.
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agencies not
subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements un72
der FISA. 1
C. Probable Cause as Protectionof Privacy
The standardof reasonablenessembodied in the Fourth Amendment
demands that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion. By its very nature electronic eavesdroppingfor a 60-day period,
even of a specified office, involves a broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only the most precise and rigorous
standardof
173
probable cause shouldjustify an intrusion of this sort.

Probable cause is the foundation upon which a search warrant may
issue. 74 It does not prevent the government from searching private areas;
rather, it establishes the constitutional standard that must be met for governmental intrusion to be valid. 175 Probable cause is based upon evidence
that establishes more than "a mere suspicion" that a crime is about to be
committed by the target of the investigation.176 It exists where "the facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has or is
' 177
being committed."

It is not an inflexible rule; it is a "non-technical conception of affording compromise accommodating opposing interests of citizens who
are to be safeguarded from unreasonable interferences with privacy and
of officers who are charged with enforcing the law."' 7 8 The probable
cause required for warrantless searches has fluctuated based upon the
perceived intrusiveness of the search, although a uniform standard is
viewed as a preferable guide to the police. 179 Due to the highly intrusive

172. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283; see also
discussion on FISA supra note 32.
173. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
174. Berger, 388 U.S. at 49.
175. Id. at 64 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
176. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
177. Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175-76 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
178. See id. at 176. In this case, the search was of an automobile moving on a public highway
and was made without a warrant by federal officers enforcing the liquor laws. Id. at 165. The
warrantless search and seizure was the result of months of investigative work in which the targets
had offered to sell illicit liquor to undercover police officers. Id. at 164. The car and license plate
used by the targets had been linked to the targets and they had been observed driving on the most
used route for the introduction of illicit liquor in the United States. Id. All of these facts constituted
the probable cause necessary to stop and search the car without a warrant. Id.
179. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1968) (allowing probable cause to be
based upon "reasonable legislative or administrative standards of conducting an area inspection
which are satisfied with respect to a particular building"). However, the Court declined to adopt a
more extended use of this balancing process. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14
(1979) ("A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time
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nature of electronic surveillance, the probable cause standard should be
maintained.1 80
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Berger v. New York foreshadowed
the adoption of Title IH of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
probable cause requirements required for
Act of 1968 and the extensive
8
electronic surveillance.' '
I also join the opinion because it condemns electronic surveillance,
for its similarity to the general warrants out of which our Revolution
sprang and allows a discreet surveillance only on a showing of 'probable cause.' These safeguards are minimal if we are to live under a
regime of wiretapping and other electronic surveillance.
...[E]ven though it is limited in time, it is the greatest of all
invasions of privacy. It places the government agent in the bedroom,
lawyer's office-in the business conference, in the social hour, in 1the
82
everywhere and anywhere a 'bug' can be placed.
D. The WarrantRequirement as a Protectionof Privacy
The warrant requirement is based in the Fourth Amendment as a
condition precedent to a lawful search by the government.' 83 A variety of
statutes established procedural guidelines to law enforcement officials
executing warrants to search areas within the individual's putative sphere
of privacy.184 One of the statutory requirements was that prior to the entry of the target's premises, the officer must have given notice to the target of the search, of the officer's authority, and of the purpose to enter
the premises.' 85 The notice requirement served several purposes, not the
least of which was to protect privacy by minimizing the chance of entry
notice allowed
of the wrong premises. Even when there was no mistake,
86
entry.
police
the
for
prepare
to
time
brief
a
within
those
The rule was not inflexible. 87 While it did require federal officers to
serve the subject of the search with a copy of the warrant and a receipt
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.").
180. See Berger,388 U.S. at 62-63.
181. See id. at 64-68 (Douglas, J., concurring).
concurring).
182. Id. at 64-65 (Douglas, J.,
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3101 (approved Oct. 11, 2002)).
185. Id.
186. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 172. Other purposes include: (i) decreasing the potential for
violence, as an unannounced entry could lead an individual to believe his safety was in peril and
cause him to take defensive measures; and (ii) preventing the physical destruction of property by
giving the occupant an opportunity to admit the officer. Id.
187. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule 41(d)
does not impose "an inflexible requirement of prior notice" (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 355 n.16 (1967)).
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that described the material obtained, it did not require that the notice be
given before the search took place. 88 This approach recognized that
there were circumstances under which prior or even contemporaneous
notification to the target of the execution of the search might compromise an ongoing investigation. 189 In those cases, a delayed notice exception was recognized for reasonable cause shown if the officers searched
the premises but did not seize any property.' 90 The officers then had to
demonstrate a good reason for the delay and had to provide the notice
within a reasonable period after the search, generally no more than seven
days. 191 In addition, if the search took place when the owner of the premises was not present, the owner would receive notice that the premises
had been lawfully searched pursuant to a warrant, rather than burglarized. 192 "The mere thought of strangers walking through and visually
examining the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for freedom as does nothing else. That passion, the true source of
the Fourth Amendment,
demands that surreptitious entries be closely
193
circumscribed."'

E. The WarrantRequirement and "Sneak and Peek'' 194 Authority Under
the PATRIOT Act
Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act amends the warrant provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3103a in several respects. 195 It allows delayed notice for reasonable cause in concert with existing precedent, but allows for the seizure of property for "reasonable necessity," a vague standard under existing law. 196 The most serious problem with section 213, however, is a
188. See Nordelli v. United States, 24 F.2d 665, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1928).
189. See Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336 (holding that the "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per
se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging
equipment" (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979))); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 355
n.16 ("[O]fficers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search
if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical
evidence.").
190. See Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (citing Dalia,441 U.S. at 248; Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16).

Searches without seizures are "less intrusive than a conventional search with physical seizure
because the latter deprives the owner not only of privacy but also of the use of his property." Id.
"The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in
the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
191. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (citing United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.
1986)).
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3101 (approved Oct. 11, 2002)).
193. Freitas,800 F.2d at 1456.
194. Kevin Corr, Sneaky But Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1103 (1995).

195.
196.

USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 286.
See Field Guidance on New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in 2001, Anti Terrorism

Legislation, at § 213, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorismi/DOJ-guidance.pdf (last
visited Oct. 28, 2002) (citing Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337; United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121,
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reflection of the uncertain meaning of "reasonable period after the
search.' ' 197 Recognizing that the requirement of notice within a reasonable period must be based upon the circumstances of each case, the jurisdictions range from seven to forty-five days as being reasonable and
authority suggests that a reasonable
therefore constitutional. 98 Some
99
1
longer.
even
be
could
period
The PATRIOT Act could have used this opportunity to clarify an
existing problem in the law. However, section 213 essentially allows the
government to delay the notice indefinitely, since the reasonable postsearch notification period may be extended by the court for "good cause
shown., 200 This broadening of the exception is not limited to investigations of suspected terrorist activity. 20 The expansion includes searches of
areas that contain material constituting evidence of any criminal offenses
in violation of the laws of the United States.20 2 This provision is not subject to the sunset provision of section 224 and is therefore a permanent
feature of the federal criminal code.20 3
2 °4

F. Pen Registers

A warrant supported by probable cause is generally required when
the government intends to intercept the content of the target's messages.20 5 When they first became available with ordinary line telephone
126 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Ibarra, 725 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (D. Wyo. 1989))
[hereinafter Anti Terrorism LegislationField Guidance].
197. See id.
198. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (stating that the initial delay should be seven days and only
extended with good cause, and relying on the argument that the Constitution itself required prompt
notice and that "[sluch time should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of
necessity" (citing Freitas, 800 F. 2d at 1456)). But see United States v. Pangbum, 983 F.2d 449,
454-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the notice requirement found in Rule 41(d) is not required by the
Fourth Amendment and stating that the court, in Villegas, did not determine that a warrant was
unconstitutional for failure to provide proper notice); United States v. Simons, 206 F. 3d 392, 403
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 45 day delay in notice of execution of warrant does not render search
unconstitutional); see also Anti Terrorism Legislation Field Guidance, supranote 196, § 213.
199. See Anti Terrorism Legislation Field Guidance, supra note 196, § 209 (citing Simons, 206
F.3d at 403).
200. See id. (discussing the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3103(a), 2705, 2510 (2000)).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (stating that Pre-PATRIOT
Act, a pen register was defined as "a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It
did not overhear oral communications and did not indicate whether calls are actually completed.").
This was not the content of the conversations themselves. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
205. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 68 (Stewart, J., concurring). The interception of content in
messages for extended periods of time is "a broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only
the most precise and rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort." Id.
(Stewart, J., concurring). This view is reflected in the elaborate system of probable cause required
for wiretaps under Title III. See id. at 64-66 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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systems, pen registers did not capture content; they only caught the telephone numbers dialed by the target from a particular telephone. 2 6 For
this reason, a court would grant the order to install and use a pen register
on the government's certification "that the information [was] likely to be
obtained by such installation and use [was] relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 2 7 The statute required the court to issue the order
upon seeing the certification and did not permit judicial review of the
government's judgment. 20 8 A judge in the telephone service provider's
jurisdiction could issue the order.2°
In Smith v. Maryland,21 ° the Supreme Court determined that the individual did not have a legitimate privacy interest in the telephone numbers he dialed. 211 There, the police chose a suspected burglar as a target
for surveillance. 2 After the burglary, the target made a series of harassing calls to the victim and drove by her home. 1 3 Pursuant to her description of the car and man, police spotted the target and recorded his license
plate number.1 4 After identifying Michael Lee Smith as the registered
owner of the car, the police requested that the telephone company "install[] a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed
from the telephone in [Smith's] home.,, 21 5 The pen register confirmed
that Smith had called the victim's telephone number from his home.21 6
Admitting the pen register tape into evidence, the trial court convicted
Smith, "holding that the warrantless21 7installation of the pen register did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.,
Despite the fact that Smith used his home telephone, the Supreme
Court found that he had "no actual expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 'le-

206. See N.Y Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161 n..
207. 8 U.S.C. § 3123 (2000) (amended 2001). This statute lacks "almost all of the significant
privacy protections found in Title III, the statute governing the interception of the actual 'content' of
a communication (e.g., a phone conversation or the text of an e-mail message)." Electronic Privacy
Info. Ctr., Analysis of Provisions of the ProposedAnti-Terrorism Act of 2001 Affecting the Privacy
of Communications and Personal Information (Sept. 24, 2001), at www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ataanalysis.html [hereinafter EPIC].
208. See EPIC, supranote 207.
209. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, Dep't of Justice, Field Guidance on
New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot

Act of 2001 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crminal/cybercrime/PatriotAct.htm [hereinafter
Computer Crime FieldGuidance].
210. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
211. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
212. Seeid. at 737.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id.
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gitimate. ' ' 21 8 Such an expectation "[was] 'not one that society [was] prepared to recognize as reasonable. ' ' 21 9 Consequently, the Court affirmed
Smith's conviction. 220
Traditionally, the Court extended a great deal of protection to activities occurring inside the home. 22' Telephone conversations, regardless of
their site of origin, enjoyed a modicum of Fourth Amendment protection. 222 In finding the site of the telephone call immaterial, the Court
added limits to the individual's sphere of privacy from electronic telephonic surveillance.223 Since the pen register did not intercept the content
of the conversation, perhaps the Court felt comfortable denying the individual's expectation of privacy, even without the order, based on the
relevance standard.
Despite the technological changes in telephony, Congress had not
amended the pen register statute since its 1984 enactment. Lower courts
compensated for the apparent failing by simply applying the pen register
statute to computer communications without legislative guidance.22 4 As a
result, various parties challenged the application of the statute to "electronic communications based' on the statute's telephone-specific language. 225 Under the PATRIOT Act, the recognition of changes in the
technology of pen registers and the maintenance of the relevance standard combine to reduce the ability of targets to challenge government
overreaching.
G. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Under the PATRIOT Act
Under section 216 of the PATRIOT Act, the pen register/trap and
trace statutes now apply to the collection of "communications on the
218. Id.at 745.
219. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)); cf United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records
because they contain information voluntarily exposed to a third party).
220. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
221. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (emphasizing "the overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic").
222. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate
the application of [the] Fourth Amendment." (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
223. See id. at 743. The Court likened the phone numbers dialed by Smith from his home
telephone to information voluntarily turned over to a third person. Id. at 743-44 (citing Miller, 425
U.S. at 442-43; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 438 (1963)). Smith assumed the risk that the telephone company could divulge the
telephone numbers, and no expectation of privacy could reside with such information. See Smith,
442 U.S. at 744.
224. See Computer Crime Field Guidance, supra note 209.
225. See id.
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Internet and other computer networks. 226 Accepting that the statute
needed an update to reflect current communications practices, the
amendments did not take into account how these changes would impact
privacy. The Act adds the terms "routing" and "addressing" to the list of
items that can be authorized for interception, 227 but does not define them.
These terms give rise to privacy concerns because of the peculiarities of
Internet operation. Calling a telephone number on an ordinary telephone
line reveals little information other than the number itself. When a call
goes through a computer, the uniform resource locators ("URLs") carry
information about the target beyond a simple address. 228 Pen registers
"attached" to computers would inform the observer what Web sites had
been visited, "which is like giving law enforcement the power -- based
only on its own certification--to require the librarian to report on the
books you had perused while visiting the public library. '229 This potentially infringes upon rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.2 ' 0 The
probable cause standard provides a more appropriate test of the legitimacy of the government's application for disclosure of the information.
Section 216 tries to avoid violations of the individual's privacy by
requiring the government to use reasonably available technology "so as
not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications. 2 3'
The statute does allow for the interception of "routing," "addressing,"
and "signaling." While the government's interpretations of this provision
say that this limits the interception to the "To" and "From" information

226. See id. Section 216 amends 18 U.S.C §§ 3121, 3123, 3124, and 3127. Id. This means that
these devices can now target such facilities as cellular telephone numbers, specific cellular
telephones, Internet user accounts or email addresses, Internet protocol addresses, and port numbers.
Id. The amendment also allows an applicant for a pen/trap order "to submit a description of the
communications to be traced using any of these or other identifiers." Id.
227. See id.
228. David W. Baker, A Guide to URLs, at http://www.netspace.org/users/dwb/urlguide.html#what (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). Unlike a telephone number,
[a] URL is like your complete mailing address: it specifies all the information necessary
for someone to address an envelope to you. However, they are much more than that, since
URLs can refer to a variety of very different types of resources. A more fitting analogy
would be a system for specifying your mailing address, your phone number, or the
location of the book you just read from the public library, all in the same format.
Id. In June 2000, the FBI advised Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that
pen register devices "capture all electronic impulses transmitted by the facility on which they are
attached, including such impulses transmitted after a phone call is connected to the called party." See
147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). "The impulses
made after the call is connected could reflect the electronic banking transactions a caller makes...
or the electronic ordering of a prescription drug." Id.
229. Am. Civil Liberties Union, USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers While Cutting
Back on Traditional Checks and Balances, An ACLU Legislative Analysis, at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l 110101a.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
230. See Am. Library Ass'n, Library Community Statement on Proposed Anti-terrorism
Measures, at http:llwww.ala.orglwashoff/terrorism.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
231. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272,288.
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contained in an e-mail header, 232 the e-mail header also includes the
"subject line," which could be considered to be content.
The courts must clarify this contradiction. In essence, section 216
allows for the collection of personal information without the privacy
protection provided by the judicial probable cause review under the established wiretap law. It retains this provision's relaxed standard of relevance, expanding the scope of potentially discoverable private informaby aution. Section 216 exacerbates this lowered standard of legitimacy 233
thorizing pen register/trap and trace orders with nationwide effect.
The practical realities of multi-jurisdictional Internet communications make it clear why the government would want this ability in its
arsenal. An order for this type of surveillance could previously be
granted only "within the jurisdiction of the court.''234 A single communication could pass through several different carriers in a range of jurisdictions.235 In order to follow the communication to its source, prior law
required that the government seek the support of a prosecutor in each
successive jurisdiction to obtain an order in that jurisdiction.236 This
slowed down the investigation.23 7
The government's practical solution imposes a burden on any carrier seeking to challenge the installation of the pen register/trap and trace
device for legal or procedural defects. Section 216 removes another legal
safeguard from the system by requiring carriers to travel to the distant
court that issued the order. 238 "The burden would be particularly acute
for smaller providers -- precisely those, for instance, who are most likely
be served with orders requiring the installation
(according to the FBI) to 239
system.,
Carnivore
the
of
The expansion of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace devices to the
Internet opens the door to the FBI's use of Carnivore without significant
court review. 24 0 Carnivore raises controversial issues because it "pro-

232. Leonard Bailey, Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section Department of
Justice, International Terrorism, the Internet, and the USA Patriot Act, at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading-room/usab5003.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
233. See id.
234. See Computer Crime Field Guidance, supra note 209.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See EPIC, supranote 207.
239. Id.
240. According to the FBI:
The Carnivore device provides the FBI with a "surgical" ability to intercept and collect
the communications which are the subject of the lawful order while ignoring those
communications which they are not authorized to intercept.... The Carnivore device
works much like commercial "sniffers" and other network diagnostic tools used by ISPs
every day, except that it provides the FBI with a unique ability to distinguish between
communications which may be lawfully intercepted and those which may not. For
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vides the FBI with access to the communications of all subscribers of a
monitored Internet Service provider [("ISP"),] . . . not just those of the
court-designated target.",24' Section 216 provides that if the communications provider cannot carry out the court order, the government may install a device of its own.242
Essentially, Section 216 allows the judge, operating under a relevance standard, to issue a blank warrant to a succession of communications carriers.24 3 This fails to meet the Fourth Amendment requirement of
specifying the place to be searched. 244 It also deprives the judge of the
ability to monitor the extent to which government officials utilize the
order to access information about Internet communications.245
Section 216 expands the scope of information subject to government
surveillance, but does not provide any of the privacy protections of prior
law. It also allows access to items containing content without any independent judicial review. These provisions, as well as the nationwide service, all reduce the individual's privacy from governmental intrusion.
This impacts both Fourth Amendment protections and First Amendment
rights. Since Congress did not subject Section 216 to the sunset provisions of Section 224 of. the PATRIOT Act, it represents a permanent
change to the federal criminal code.

example, if a court order provides for the lawful interception of one type of
communication (e.g., e-mail), but excludes all other communications (e.g., online
shopping) the Carnivore tool can be configured to intercept only those e-mails being
transmitted either to or from the named subject.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, at www.fbi.gov.hqlab/camivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
241. EPIC, supra note 207. In response to the FBI's introduction of Carnivore in July 2000,
some members of Congress expressed their "intent to examine the issues and draft appropriate
legislation." Id.
242. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 289. Under these
circumstances,
[slection 216 require[s] the law enforcement agency to provide the following information
to the court under seal within 30 days: (1) the identity of the officers who installed or
accessed the device; (2) the date and time the device was installed, accessed, and
uninstalled; (3) the configuration of the device at installation and any modifications to
that configuration; and (4) information collected by the device.
See Computer Crime Field Guidance, supra note 209. The government may use devices such as
Etherpeek or DCS 1000 (a.k.a. Carnivore). See id.
243. The section does require that the issuing court have jurisdiction over the particular crime
being investigated. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272,290.
244. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
245. The certification of probable cause by a neutral magistrate protects the privacy of the
subject of a proposed search from the over-zealousness of the police in their attempt to discover
evidence of a crime. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (discussing the importance
of the magistrate's informed decisions on probable cause); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (discussing the warrant as a guard against govemmental eagerness to search apparently
private areas).
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I1. THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANSION OF FISA TO
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement officials often pursue intelligence surveillance by
the use of wiretapping technologies. Consequently, the PATRIOT Act
closely links the federal wiretapping statute and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA"). The divergent histories of these two statutes
provide the most compelling arguments for retracting the extensive
grants of authority given to the executive branch under the PATRIOT
Act. Without the reestablishment of traditional checks and balances on
the government's ability to conduct domestic clandestine surveillance,
the history of the government's flagrant violations of the individual's
exercise of First Amendment freedom could become this nation's prologue.
A. Intelligence Surveillance and Wiretapping
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government - however benevolent and benign its motives - to view with suspicion those
who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in theirpolitical beliefs.
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdroppingdeter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private
dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to ourfree so-

ciety.246
Through its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has narrowed the legitimate sphere of the individual's privacy in
the attempt to balance the government's need to regulate activity and the
citizens' right to live free from government involvement.247 The inevitable conflict between these two imperatives becomes tenser when the
government performs surveillance to protect national security. 248 In its
amendments to FISA, the PATRIOT Act abandons a long held taboo and
extends domestic surveillance authority to the Central Intelligence

246. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
247. While the Fourth Amendment "protects ...
against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion .... its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all," while other
aspects of privacy are protected by different provisions of the Constitution or left to state law. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, 350-51 (1967).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 292-301 concerning the prior restraints on foreign
intelligence surveillance under FISA. See generally William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana,
WarrantlessPhysical Searches For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, Executive Order 12,333 and The
Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97 (1985) (describing the use of warrantless physical
searches, and judicial exceptions and parameters for intelligence gathering).
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Agency ("CIA"). 249 This action eliminates a long recognized distinction
between acceptable warrantless electronic surveillance performed in the
name of national security and surveillance supported by probable cause
necessary for the prosecution of ordinary criminal matters.
Governmental surveillance for the protection of national security
emphasizes the interdependency of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech and of association and the Fourth Amendment's freedom from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.25 ' Neither value can "exist without
Abuse of the governmental prerogative to institute surveilthe other.
lance without judicial oversight has been demonstrated to negatively
impact the other freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 253
B. The TraditionalProhibitionof DomesticAuthorityfor Intelligence
Collection
The government has used clandestine electronic surveillance devices for many years.2 54 Olmsteadv. UnitedStates2 55 supported the use of
these techniques by excluding governmental wiretapping from the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment.25 6 Enacted shortly after the Olmstead decision, the Federal Communications Act ("FCA") of 1934 protected citizens from the unauthorized disclosure of information obtained through
electronic surveillance and from the use of the fruits of government wiretaps. 57 It did not, however, stop the practice of clandestine surveillance.
Despite the enactment of the FCA, the government continued to
employ warrantless electronic surveillance in cases involving national
security or threats to human life. 8 Congress perceived this ability as so
threatening to democracy that it limited the CIA to the investigation of

249. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 901, 115 Stat. 272, 387 (2001).
250. Aware of the potential for abuse, Congress "was unwilling to make [the CIA] a policeman
at home, or to create conflict between the CIA and the FBI." Weissman v. CIA, 565 F. 2d 692, 695
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see generally Sherri J. Conrad, Executive Order 12,333: Unleashing The CIA
Violates the Leash Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 968 (1985).
See RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA
251.
MATERIALS 193 (West 1999).

L. ALLEN,

PRIVACY LAW:

CASES AND

252. Id. at 194.
253. See id.
254. See Intelligence Activities: The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong. 84, 87 (1975) (statement of Att'y Gen. Edward H. Levi) [hereinafter
Intelligence Activities]; Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a JudicialRole
in NationalSecurity Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1116 (1980).

255. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and
Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
256. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
257. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380-82 (1937).
258. Intelligence Activities, supra note 254, at 85-87.
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non-domestic issues.259 Congress later construed this to mean that the
CIA could also conduct clandestine intelligence gathering and surveillance abroad. 26
From the beginning, congressional leaders recognized the potential
for abuse by an organization with authority to pursue clandestine surveillance.
[The C]entral [Ilntelligence agency is supposed to collect military intelligence abroad: but we want to be sure it cannot strike down into
the lives of our own people here. So we put in a provision that the
agency shall have no police,26 subp[o]ena,
law-enforcement powers, or
1
internal-security functions.
Congress, therefore, limited the CIA's activities to foreign intelligence
gathering because of the potential for abuse inherent in making the CIA
"a policeman at home. 2 62 Administration officials reemphasized the
primacy of the law barring the CIA from domestic intelligence collection
activities. 263
In Weisman v. CIA, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the National Security Act of 1947 "was intended, at the
very least, to prohibit the CIA from conducting secret investigations of
United States citizens, in this country, who have no connection with the
Agency. '' 264 The court noted:

259. The CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic services ("OSS"), which President Roosevelt
created to gather and analyze wartime strategic information. COMM'N ON CIA ACTivITIES WITHIN
THE UNITED

STATES,

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

45

(1975)

[hereinafter

ROCKEFELLER

COMMISSION]; see generally H. RANSOM, THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT (1970). Disbanded
in 1945, the OSS had no domestic surveillance authority. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra, at 46.
Two years later, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group ("CIG") to operate abroad.
See generally Michael Warner, Salvage and Liquidate: the Creation of the Central Intelligence
Agency, at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/salvage.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
Finally, the National Security Act of 1947 replaced the CIG with the CIA and again restricted the
agency's activities to overseas intelligence activities. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80253, § 102, 61 Stat. 495, 498 (1947).
260. S. REP. No. 94-755, bk.l, at 128 (1976).
261. Conrad, supra note 250, at 974-75 (alteration in original).
262. Weissman, 565 F.2d at 695.
263. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 975. In 1947, Central Intelligence Group Director
Vandenberg told Congress that the "prohibition against police powers or internal security functions
will assure that the Central Intelligence Group [predecessor of Central Intelligence Agency] can
never become a Gestapo or Security Police." Id. (quoting Hearing on S. 758 Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong. 497 (1947) (statement of Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director,
Central Intelligence Group)). Dr. Vannevar Bush echoed this theme when he testified before
Congress that the CIA posed "no danger" of becoming a Gestapo because "the bill provides clearly
that it is... not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs." See National Security Act of 1947:
Hearings on H.R. 2319 Before the House Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec. Departments, 80th
Cong. 559 (1947) (testimony of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Joint Research and Development
Board, War and Navy Departments).
264. Weissman, 565 F.2d at 695.
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Congress wisely sought from the outset to make sure that when it released the CIA genie from the lamp, the Agency would be prevented
from using its enormous resources and broad delegation of power to
place United States citizens living at home under surveillance and
scrutiny. It denied the Agency police or internal-security functions to
obviate the possibility that overzealous representatives of the CIA
might pry into the lives and thoughts of citizens265whose conduct or
words might seem unconventional or subversive.
When an investigation targeted "an agent of a foreign power," however,
the intelligence community continued to pursue warrantless surveillance
on the assumption that an exemption266to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement authorized such activity.
The Supreme Court reserved judgment on the issue as it related to
national security, but the justices did not unanimously support that position. In a footnote to the Katz decision, the majority stated that they had
not been asked to determine "whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a
situation involving the national security., 267 The Court inferred that in
matters of national security, the executive branch's determination of necessity would alleviate the need for government agents to comply with
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.268
Granting such deference to the executive branch prompted a concurring opinion from Justice Douglas. Justice Douglas decried it as a
"wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to
electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive
Branch itself labels 'national security' matters., 269 Justice Douglas observed that in matters of national security the President and the Attorney
General could not be "neutral and disinterested," but rather they must act
as interested parties-adversaries protecting the nation's interests.270 If
the executive branch tried to simultaneously wear both hats, Douglas
speculated that the individual's freedom, as protected by the Fourth
Amendment, would suffer.2 7'

265. Id.; see also Bimbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 329-32 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing
the authority of the CIA).
266. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979; see generally David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order
12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of WarrantlessNational Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.
611 (1983) (arguing the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is
unconstitutional).
267. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
268. It is peculiar that the Court would make such a statement outside of the issues raised. It
could be that the Court made the statement in reference to Congressional discussion of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, enacted the following year.
269. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
270. See id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
271. See id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers ....

I cannot agree that

where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured where the President and Attorney General assume both the position272 of adversary-and-prosecutor and
disinterested, neutral magistrate.
Justice Douglas observed that the framers of the Constitution did not
distinguish between types of crimes in considering the application of the
Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure.273
As such, the judiciary should maintain its oversight of the executive
branch's exercise of surveillance, even under circumstances of national
emergency. The rules should "not [be] improvise[d] because a particular
crime seems particularly heinous. 274
Likewise, in United States v. United States DistrictCourt, the Court
declined to address whether the Fourth Amendment applied to foreign
intelligence surveillance.275 It also rejected the government's claim of a
national security exemption from the Fourth Amendment for domestic
matters because of the impact such license could have on civil liberties 276
.

The PATRIOT Act's creation of the crimes of "domestic terrorism"
and "harboring a terrorist '277 could negatively impact the exercise of
unpopular political ideas, just as the Court warned in these prior cases.
Section 802 of the PATRIOT Act defines domestic terrorism as activities
that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B)

appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and

272. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
273. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring). Here, Justice Douglas noted that Article III, section 3 of
the U.S. Constitution gave treason a limited definition, but it did not receive special status under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
274. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
275. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321-22 ("We have not addressed, and express no
opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents.").
276. See id. at 320.
277. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 802-03, 115 Stat. 272, 376.
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(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.27

Section 803 of the PATRIOT Act makes the act of harboring or concealing any person known or reasonably believed to have committed one of
several named offenses a crime punishable by fine, imprisonment, or
both.279 If section 802 clearly defined the crime of domestic terrorism,
section 803 would be less problematic. Section 802, however, could be
subject to constitutional challenge as being both vague and overbroad.
Under the language of section 803, the government could classify as domestic terrorism any activity it found unpopular, including such legitimate activist actions as labor union strikes and protests concerning abortion rights, animal rights, civil rights, the environment, or the G-4. A
comprehensive provision such as section 803 invites government overreaching.
Protests that arouse the emotions of a large crowd could become
dangerous to human life. By their terms, protests intend to "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" and/or to "influence the policy of a government., 280 The government may also disfavor protests challenging its
policies. Provisions such as sections 802 and 803 could make any such
group or participating individual a target of governmental surveillance.
Unfortunately, this concern is not a speculative one. Less than 30
years ago, the government of the United States was found by a Senate
committee to have violated the civil liberties of American citizens who
challenged governmental policies.2 sl In one case, the government repeatedly conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of an organization's
lawful contacts with citizens of Soviet Russia.282 Attorney John Mitchell
authorized several surveillance requests to provide the FBI with advance
knowledge of any activities that could cause international embarrassment

278. Id. § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 375. "International Terrorism" is defined, in part, as "activities
that... occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)
(2000).
279. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 803, 115 Stat. 272, 376-77.
280. Id. § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 375.
281. In 1975, the United States Senate established a committee to "conduct an investigation of
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which illegal,
improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government." S. Res.
21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975). Under the leadership of Sen. Frank Church, the Committee made the
following statement in its report: "The Committee's investigation has .... confirmed substantial
wrongdoing. And ithad demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed
and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of
government." S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976). "United States intelligence agencies have investigated a
vast number of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed
over 500,000 domestic intelligence files." Id. at 6.
282. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 608-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Jewish Defense
League contacted Soviet citizens concerning that country's restrictive emigration policies. Id.
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to the United States.2 83 Several other vast investigations occurred even
when the citizens concerned had no ties to foreign powers.2 84
In several instances, the government used collected information to
actively disrupt protest organizations.28 5 To discredit the leaders of activist organizations, the government selectively leaked negative information
about the individuals to third parties.2 86 Through its COINTELPRO program, the FBI selectively shared "information from its investigations to
deny people employment and to smear their reputations. 28 7 The Church
Committee Report documented the FBI's attempt to discredit Dr. Martin
Luther King.288 The FBI justified its continued political surveillance of
Dr. King by saying "that some of [his] advisors were Communists," i.e.,
a threat to national security.2 89 It then disclosed derogatory information
about Dr. King to the "media and other private organizations" in an effort to block his selection as a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.2 90 The
FBI also resorted to the intimidation and harassment of Dr. King. In one
instance, the FBI sent a prepared composite tape recording to Dr. King
apparently inviting him to commit suicide.291 The government took these
actions under a system that provided little or no oversight of its intelligence collection activities.

283. Id.
at 610.
284. Due to allegations of improper surveillance, President Ford formed the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States under the leadership of then Vice President Rockefeller. See
Exec. Order No. 11,828, 40 Fed. Reg. 1219 (1975). The Commission's investigation confirmed that
the Agency collected information on several individuals, many of whom were civil rights and antiwar activists. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 259. The Agency had intercepted, opened,
and photographed first class letters, and indexed and computerized the names of alleged domestic
political dissidents. Id. The Church Committee Report described how Project MERRIMAC
"expanded into a general collection effort whose results were made available to other components in
the CIA, and... the FBI." See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 725 (1976).
285. 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).,
286. See id.
287. Id.
Beginning with Communist and socialist groups, the FBI's COINTELPRO operations
spread in the 1960s to the Klan, the "new left," and black militants. Elements of the civil
rights and antiwar movements were targeted for disruption because of suspicion that they
were "influenced" by communists; others because of their strident rhetoric. When some
targets were suspected of engaging in violence, the FBI's tactics went so far as to place
lives in jeopardy by passing false allegations that individuals were government
informants.
Id.
288. See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 11 (1976).
289. 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02, S10993 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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292

Concerns over the domestic abuse of surveillance gave rise to FISA,
which instituted a set of procedures for the electronic collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.293 Significantly, FISA allowed
the government a higher degree of governmental intrusion with a significantly lowered standard of review in certain instances when seeking foreign intelligence information. 294 When applying for an order, FISA required the government to identify the target of the surveillance, list the
information relied on by the government to demonstrate that the target
represented "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power," and certify
that the order sought to obtain "foreign intelligence information. 295
FISA's provisions established a scheme of surveillance oversight that
purportedly protected the individual's privacy.296
Since the government could authorize foreign intelligence surveillance under less than a probable cause standard, the government could
use it at trial only with the Attorney General's advance authorization and
after giving notice to the "aggrieved person. 2 97 This notice gave rise to
the aggrieved person's opportunity to suppress the information based on
the illegality of the surveillance. 298 However, reviewing courts consid-

292. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978).
293. See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3974.
294. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92
Stat. 1783, 1786. Otherwise, FISA maintains the requirement of a court order authorizing foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance. The order requirements under FISA are similar to those for
obtaining an order under Title Ill. After obtaining the Attorney General's approval, the federal
officer must make application for the order to one of seven U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("USFISC") judges. See id. §§ 103-104, 92 Stat. 1783, 1788-90.
295. See id. § 102(b), 92 Stat. 1783, 1787. FISA also required that the application list the
evidence showing that the foreign power or its agent used or planned to use the site of the
surveillance; state the type of surveillance the government planned to use; and list the government's
proposed minimization procedures. See id. Under FISA, the USFISC judge must make a specific
finding that each element of the application is supported by probable cause and that the proposed
minimization procedures are proper. Id. § 105, 92 Stat. 1783, 1790-93. One of FISA's most
important judicial oversight provisions states that the government cannot classify a 'United States
person' as "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment." Id. § 105(a)(3)(A), 92 Stat. 1783, 1790.
296. See Helene E. Schwartz, Oversight of.Minimization Compliance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Job, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 41433 (1981). The executive branch of government, through its Attorney General, established
minimization procedures as well as internal review procedures and supervision of warrantless
surveillance. Id. The judiciary could impact the surveillance at three stages: passing on applications,
assessing the legality of the surveillance, and imposing civil or criminal liability for violations. Id. at
433-72. Finally, reports concerning surveillance pursued under this section had to be submitted to
Congress. Id. at 472-83.
297. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106(c), 92
Stat. 1783, 1793.
298. Id. § 106(e), 92 Stat. 1783, 1794.

BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR

2002]

ered an Attorney General's wiretap order presumptively valid, making it
299
difficult for an individual to challenge the legality of the surveillance.
In addition, a motion to suppress did not guarantee disclosure of the information to the aggrieved person. 300 The court could disclose the information "only where such disclosure is necessary1 to make an accurate
determination of the legality of the surveillance.30
D. The Collision of Title III Evidence Collection and ForeignIntelligence Surveillance
Several provisions of the PATRIOT Act ignore the distinction between the collection of information for domestic criminal investigations
and foreign intelligence collection. This destroys the traditional balance
between the government and the individual under the Fourth Amendment. Before the PATRIOT Act, in cases assessing motions to suppress
or requesting disclosure of FISA-collected information, the courts emphasized the distinction between cases of surveillance under FISA and
those under Title 111.302
In United States v. Belfield, °3 the government charged the defendants with "conspiracy to murder, accessory after the fact, grand larceny,
unauthorized use of a vehicle, and perjury in connection with [an] assassination. ' ' ° The defendants "requested disclosure of any electronic
surveillance" concerning them. 30 5 The government admitted overhearing
each of the defendants during electronic surveillance authorized under
FISA.306
Pursuant to the statute, the district court judge made an ex parte determination of the legality of the surveillance after examining the relevant evidence in camera.30 7 The defendants challenged the procedures on
both statutory and procedural grounds. 30 8 The defendants asserted that
the mandatory disclosure provisions of Title HI "must be read into FISA

299. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979 (approving electronic surveillance of illegal
bookmaking suspects (citing United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1976));
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1975) (approving interception of wire
communications of alleged narcotics conspirators).
300. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106(f),
92 Stat. 1783, 1794. By filing an affidavit under oath that the disclosure of the information would
harm the national security of the United States, the Attorney General may request an ex parte
determination of the legality of the surveillance based upon an in camera examination of the relevant
materials. Id.
301. Id.
302. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
303. 692 F.2d 141, 143.
304. See id. at 143.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 144.
308.

See id.
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to save it from constitutional infirmity. ' 309 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating:
Appellants ...completely ignore the nature of the national interests
implicated in matters involving a foreign power or its agents. [Title
III] covers domestic, criminal surveillance. FISA is concerned with
foreign intelligence surveillance. In the former, Congress emphasized
the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. In the latter, Congress recognized
the need for the Executive to engage in and employ the fruits of clandestine surveillance
without being constantly hamstrung by disclo3 10
sure requirements.

The statutory scheme under FISA "center[ed] on an expanded conception of minimization that differs from that which governs lawenforcement surveillance."' 3 11 Pursuant to FISA, the court merely determines whether the application and order comply with the statutory requirements: "No further judicial procedures are necessary to adequately
safeguard appellants' rights." 312 This differs from the standard of checks
and balances that characterizes domestic criminal law.
Perhaps because of this, the courts have tended to condemn domestic warrantless electronic surveillance, even if the target posed a "domestic threat[] to the national security." 313 By contrast, when the circum-

stances involved surveillance of foreign nationals, the lower courts generally upheld the surveillance.3t 4 When the surveillance had both domestic criminal investigative and foreign intelligence purposes, however, the
lower courts upheld the warrantless electronic surveillance of American
citizens despite its impact on the rights of the accused.31 5

309. See id. at 148. The defendants relied on section 2518 of Title I, which provides that "the
contents of an intercepted communication may not be used in any proceeding unless the aggrieved
person is first furnished with a copy of the application and the court order authorizing the
interception." See id. at 184 n.3 1.
310. Id. at 148.
311. See id. (citing Helene E. Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Job, 12 RUTGERs L.J.
405, 408 (1981)).
312. See id. at 149.
313. See, e.g., United States Dist. Court,407 U.S. at 320, 322, 323-24.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914-15 (4th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). The government sought to use the results of wiretaps in its case
against Muhammad Ali, then known as Cassius Clay, for violating the Selective Service Act. Clay,
430 F.2d at 166. While ordering disclosure of four of the five conversations, the court of appeals
upheld the district court's conclusion that the fifth wiretapped conversation resulted from "lawful
surveillance by the FBI pursuant to the Attorney General's authorization of a wiretap for the purpose
of gathering foreign intelligence," and therefore would not be disclosed to Clay. See id. at 166, 171;
see also United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming the President's power
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The information-sharing agreements enjoyed by the various intelligence groups and the FBI partly made possible the abuses of the 1970s.
The Church Committee Report documented a CIA-FBI agreement that
improved the intelligence coordination between the two agencies. "[T]he
policies embodied in that agreement clearly involved the CIA in the performance of internal security functions. 3 6 In essence, requiring the FBI
and the CIA to cooperate in intelligence collection circumvented the National Security Act's prohibition against the CIA's participation in domestic intelligence gathering.31 7 The CIA's partnership with the FBI did
not make this practice legitimate. 1 8
E. BroadenedScope of FISA Surveillance on the Domestic Front Under
the PATRIOTAct
Congress enacted FISA to curtail these abuses, but President
Reagan reintroduced the CIA-FBI partnership model in Executive Order
12,333. 3 '9 The PATRIOT Act augments this type of partnership on an
unprecedented scale. It also magnifies the potential for government violation of the individual's privacy. Section 905 of the PATRIOT Act requires that other agencies share with the Director of the CIA any "foreign
law investigaintelligence" collected in the course of federal criminal
320
tions, unless the Attorney General makes exceptions.
Under section 203, sensitive personal, political, and business information about any individual or company collected in the course of a
grand jury, domestic law enforcement wiretap, or any other criminal investigation must now be disclosed to any intelligence, defense, and national security agency if the information involves foreign intelligence.3 21

to "authorize warrantless wiretaps" to gather foreign intelligence in circumstances where the
government incidentally overheard an American citizen's conversations).
316. Conrad, supra note 250, at 971; see also S. REP. No. 94-755, at 97 (1976).
317. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 973-74 (discussing the CIA's exclusion from domestic
operations).
318. See id. at 981-82 (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,3333 and other agreements that sought to
improve the coordination between the CIA and the FBI).
319. See id. President Regan promulgated Executive Order 12,333 in 1981. Exec. Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). The order delegated to the Attorney General the power
to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States
person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law
enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Id.
320. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 905(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 389.
321. See id. § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 279-81. Foreign intelligence is defined as "information
relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof,
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities." 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2)
(2000). Foreign intelligence information includes "information about a United States person that
concerns a foreign power or foreign territory and 'that relates to the national defense or the security
of the United States."' See 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
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Americans have generally felt free to conduct business and personal
relationships with foreign governments or nationals and to express personal opinions about governmental policy without recourse. These communications could be entirely legal, but they could also fit the definition
of foreign intelligence information. As such, the PATRIOT Act makes
these communications eligible for broad dissemination to any government official.322
While prior law allowed information sharing between grand juries,
the court supervised the disclosure of such information. 323 Section 203
does not provide such oversight of these information-sharing activities
and does not limit the purposes for which the information can be disclosed. Section 203 creates a fundamental change in the existing criminal
justice system, as Congress did not limit its scope to investigations about
terrorism.

The indiscriminant sharing of information ignores the radically different purposes of the domestic criminal law system and that of foreign
intelligence gathering.32 4 Unlike domestic criminal law investigations,
foreign intelligence surveillance may not consider the ultimate truth of
the information collected as an objective. A disclosure of innuendo and
inference may significantly harm an individual's reputation. A system
that lacks checks and balances will likely disclose inaccurate or incomplete information.
In the course of an ordinary criminal investigation, the government
may collect information on individuals not involved in any illegal activity. The lack of guidelines for using this information exacerbates the potential for misuse during any information-sharing activities.
Many individuals are investigated and later cleared. Many cases are
investigated and never prosecuted. Many witnesses are interviewed
whose testimony never surfaces at trial. Immunity is granted to compel testimony before grand juries about people who are never indicted. Wiretaps and microphone "bugs" and computer communications intercepts pick up extensive information about activities and

322. See 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
323. Id. at S11005-06.
324. See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3973, 3981.
The criminal laws are enacted to establish standards for arrest and conviction; and they
supply guidance for investigations conducted to collect evidence for prosecution. Foreign
counterintelligence investigations have different objectives. They succeed when the
United States can insure that an intelligence network is not obtaining vital information.
. . . Prosecution is a useful deterrent, but only where the advantages outweigh the
sacrifice of other interests. Therefore, procedures appropriate in regular criminal
investigations need modification to fit the counterintelligence context.
Id.; see also Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 248, at 133.
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opinions and personal lives that have no relevance to the criminal activity they are authorized to detect or monitor. 325
The standard for the collection of this information requires only that investigators consider it "relevant to an investigation. '32 6 Despite this, section 203 allows broad disclosure within the law enforcement community
of information falling under the heading of foreign intelligence or foreign
intelligence information, further detaching it from its original relevance.
The government could use information collected under FISA's relevance
standard in a domestic criminal law investigation employing a probable
cause standard. This would violate the rights of the individual. Without
limitations on its retention, this information collection could lead to the
return of the abuses of the 1970s with development of secret dossiers on
individuals.
Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act amends the definition of the term
"foreign intelligence information," 327 which compounds the concerns
over the broad dissemination of information about individuals under section 203. FISA provided a lowered standard for foreign intelligence surveillance, but restricted its use to circumstances where obtaining foreign
intelligence data represented the sole or primary purpose of the investigation.328 Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA to apply in situations where foreign intelligence collection represents only a "significant
purpose" of the investigation.329
The amendment further blurs the lines between acceptable foreign
intelligence gathering on a reasonableness standard and the probable
cause requirements of domestic criminal investigations. If the government conducts surveillance by wiretap for the purpose of obtaining information relevant to both a domestic criminal investigation and foreign
intelligence activities, the government could avoid the probable cause
requirements of Title III. The individual would lose vital privacy protection as a result. This "would be a significant alteration to the delicate
constitutional balance that is33reflected
in the current legal regime govern0
ing electronic surveillance."
F. BroadAccess to Records and Other Items Under FISA
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA by giving the government the authority to require the production of "any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

147 CONG. REC. S 10990-02, S 10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
See id.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272,291.
See EPIC, supra note 207.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291.
See EPIC, supra note 207 (discussing a similar provision of a predecessor bill).
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investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." 331 Although narrowly circumscribed on its face,
section 215 provides that the government conduct such investigations
"under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
Order No. 12,333. ' '332 This has potentially serious consequences for privacy.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,333, "Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented
physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring
devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the
head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. 333
The fact that the procedures established by the Attorney General are
themselves "not subject to review ... by any public body" raises concerns. 334 The Order allows the Attorney General to authorize "any technique for which a warrant would [ordinarily] be required ... [upon a
unilateral judgment] that the technique is directed against a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power., 335 The lack of a definition for the
term "agent of a foreign power" means that the characterization of the
target falls exclusively within the discretion of the Attorney General as
well.336
While the FBI must apply for an order to the special FISA court, the
court will grant the order on less than probable cause.337 The government
need only certify that it seeks the records for an authorized investigation
conducted pursuant to the Attorney General's procedures, and that the
investigation intends to obtain foreign intelligence information, a very
broadly defined term.338 Since the Attorney General has the sole discretion to define the parameters of the investigation, the government obtains
access to a broad range of private records in potential violation of the
individual's privacy.
Section 905 of the PATRIOT Act further reduces the individual's
sphere of privacy by requiring law enforcement agencies to share sensitive "foreign intelligence information" about Americans with intelligence
agencies through the Director of the CIA, unless the Attorney General

331. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287.
332. See id. President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,333, which greatly
expanded the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct domestic intelligence
operations. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
333. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, § 2.4.
334. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 977.
335. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, § 2.5.
336. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979.
337. See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of FISA.
338. See definition of "foreign intelligence information," supra note 321.

2002]

BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR

419

makes exceptions. 33 9 As history has shown, such arrangements increase
the potential for governmental overreaching.
Despite their descriptive titles, "foreign intelligence" and "foreign
intelligence information" could include sensitive information about an
individual's lawful business transactions, political relationships, and personal opinions concerning members of a foreign government. 340 The First
and Fifth Amendments by virtue of the Fourth Amendment currently
protect these activities. However, a legislative enactment that removes
them from constitutional protection implies that society no longer recognizes the individual's subjective expectation of privacy in these records
as legitimate.
Over the years, various Executive Orders have modified the express
bar to domestic authority, but it would seem that any further extension to
the CIA's domestic surveillance power would contravene its charter under the National Security Act. 34'
Section 506 of the PATRIOT Act gives concurrent jurisdiction to
the Secret Service to investigate certain computer-related offenses under
18 U.S.C. § 1030.342 This returns the Secret Service to the full authority
343
it had before 1996 to investigate any and all violations of section 1 0 3 0 .
Ostensibly, this extension of authority allows the Secret Service to protect critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks. 344 Like many other provisions of the PATRIOT Act, Congress did not limit this change by the
terms of the Act, and it becomes a permanent feature of our criminal
laws.

339. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 905(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 389; see supra text
accompanying note 32; see also 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
340. See definition of "foreign intelligence," supra note 321.
341. For instance, President Carter's Executive Order No. 12,036 prohibited surveillance
against United States persons abroad. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, § 2-202 (Jan. 24,
1978). President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,333, however, allows such surveillance "even if
the CIA has no reason to believe the target is ... an 'agent of a foreign power."' See Conrad, supra
note 250, at 978.
342. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 506(a), 115 Stat. 272, 367. In 1995, the Secret
Service created the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force ("NYECTF"). See 147 CONG. REC.
S10990-02, S10998 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). This group includes members from industry law
enforcement and academia and "has successfully investigated a range of financial and electronic
crimes." Id. Section 105 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes the Secret Service to create similar task
forces in other parts of the country. Id.
343. See 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10998 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). The 1996 amendments
to section 1030 concentrated the authority of the Secret Service on specific sections of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. Id. Section 506 of the PATRIOT Act permits the Justice and Treasury
Departments to work out the parameters of the new concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
344. Id.
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G. Privacy Protection Under Title III (Wiretap Statute)
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
to obtain disclosure in court of what is
stretching upon the rack,
345
whispered in the closet.

When first confronted with the issue of whether wiretaP4ing violated the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead v. United States,

the Su-

preme Court held that wiretapping did not constitute a search.347 However, even the majority recognized the danger of permitting unrestrained
governmental surveillance and suggested a practical limitation to guard
against governmental overreaching. The Court noted, "Congress may of
course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials. 34 8 The
overturned the Olmstead decision in Katz v. United
Court ultimately
49
3

States.

The Federal Communications Act of 1934 ("FCA")35 ° did not explicitly adopt the Court's suggestion for the protection of privacy. However, some interpreted certain language in the FCA as statutory authority
for the existence of the Olmstead exclusionary rule. Section 605 of the
FCA provided, "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person., 35' The Court interpreted section 605 to prevent testimony concerning the contents of wiretapped conversations in court
because "to recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court
[would be] to divulge the message. 3 52 The Court later held the exclu-

345. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
346. 277 U.S. 438.
347. Id. at 466. The Court provided two bases for its decision. First, there had been no entry of
the premises that would give rise to a search. Id. Second, while the agents "captured" the content of
the conversations, they had not acquired any physical objects that would constitute a seizure. Id. This
trespass model was followed by the Court in a number of decisions, including Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (placing a detectaphone against a wall of an adjoining office where the
police were lawfully present did not constitute a trespass), and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (incriminating information from bug planted on an acquaintance of target by consent).
348. Olmstead,277 U.S. at 465.
349. 389 U.S. 347, 353.
350. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). The FCA was the
first federal statute to establish procedural protections against electronic surveillance by the
government.
351. Id. § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1068.
352. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379.
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sionary rule applicable to derivative evidence,3 53 to intrastate communications,354 and to the actions of state officers.355
Section 605 frustrated both law enforcement and privacy advocates.
It allowed private citizens and public officials to ignore its prohibitions,
but banned the use of electronic surveillance in police investigations for
even the most serious of federal offenses. 356 Since the FCA did not preempt state law, state criminal prosecutors could admit wiretaps that did
not meet section 605's standards. 357 Finally, section 605 did not bar intelligence surveillance. 358 The government continued to use wiretaps to
collect foreign intelligence for national security purposes. 359 The government supported this continued use with the rationale that it could lawfully "intercept" communications, but not "divulge" them. 360 Further, the
government contended that it did not divulge information in its internal
communications, but only if it released the information to an outside
party. 36 1 Foreign intelligence surveillance rarely resulted in prosecution,
leaving little chance that the government would divulge an intercepted
communication.
Since no legislature had codified the Olmstead exclusionary rule,
courts did not have to follow it. The sphere of the individual's privacy
received uneven treatment in courts called upon to determine whether to
admit or exclude evidence produced from wiretaps. 362 Recognizing the
need for substantive restraint against police action, the courts ultimately
3 63
the Court stated
upheld the validity of the exclusion. In Lee v. Florida,
that the exclusionary rule was "counseled by experience. '' 364 The Court's
research of section 605 violations had "failed to uncover a single reported prosecution of a law enforcement officer for a violation of
s[ection] 605 since the statute was enacted., 365 The Court "concluded...
that nothing short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence [would]

353.
354.
355.
356.

See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957).
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 261 (3d ed. 2000).

357.

See JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECrRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.4(a) (2d ed. 1989).

358. See Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195,
197-99 (1954); John F. Decker & Joel Handler, ElectronicSurveillance: Standards,Restrictions and
Remedies, 12 CAL W. L. REV. 60, 63-64 (1975).
359. See Brownell, supra note 358, at 199.
360. See id. at 197.
361. See Decker & Handler, supranote 358, at 64.
362. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1968) (evidence excluded); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (evidence excluded); Benanti, 355 U. S. at 105-06 (evidence excluded);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) (evidence admitted), overruled by Lee, 392 U.S. at
386-87; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (evidence admitted), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 660.
363. 392 U.S. 378.
364. Lee, 392 U.S. at 386,
365. Id.
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compel respect for the federal law 'in the only
effectively available way ' 366
- by removing the incentive to disregard it.'
In addition to these failings, it became clear that section 605 could
not keep pace with the advances in surveillance technology. 367 In order to
balance law enforcement's need to use the latest technology with the
individual's right to some degree of privacy, Congress enacted Title
111.368 Congress intended Title III to protect privacy by defining a uniform procedure for the "interception of wire and oral communications. 369 Only a "court of competent jurisdiction" could authorize such
interception.37 ° In this manner, the statute safeguarded the privacy of
innocent persons who had not consented to the interception of their wire
or oral communications. 37' As additional protection, Congress required
that the interception remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. 372
Section 2518 provided a template for obtaining court-approved interception and listed the contents of a valid application for court ordered
surveillance.37 3 It also restricted the scope and duration of the surveillance.374 Title III provided several layers of privacy protection. A court
would issue a warrant for the interception if the government met the provision's detailed probable cause requirements.3 75 The standard under
Title III required probable cause to believe that "an individual [was]
committing, ha[d] committed, or [was] about to commit" one of the
enumerated offenses, and that "particular communications concerning
that offense [would] be obtained through such interception. 376 It required that the order state with specificity the target's identity, the location of the interception, the identity of the agency authorized to intercept,

366. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
367. See LAFAVE, supra note 356, at 260.
368. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)). Title 1HIwas part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Congress noted that "there [had] been
extensive wiretapping carried on without legal sanctions, and without the consent of any of the
parties to the conversations." Id. § 801, 82 Stat. 197, 374-75.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. Id.
373. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 261-62.
374. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 263.
375. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 262. Under Title Ili, a judge could order a wiretap if he
determined, among other things, that probable cause existed to believe "that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit" one of the enumerated offenses and "the
facilities from which, or the place where, the . . . communications are to be intercepted are being
used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to,
listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person." Id.
376. Id.
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and the identity of the person authorizing the interception. 377 It also required a statement of whether the interception must cease immediately
upon obtaining the communication described in the application.378 Strict
duration requirements also attached.3 79
This heightened probable cause requirement reflected the heightened privacy intrusion presented by wiretaps.38 ° Wiretaps differ from
physical search warrants in that the orders allow continuing surveillance
for up to 30 days with possible extensions. 381 The government could
overhear all conversations transpiring during that period without regard
to relevancy. 382 "Only the most precise and rigorous standard of probable
cause should justify an intrusion of this sort. 383 The failure to obtain an
order would result in the invalidation of even narrowly tailored surveillance.
However, Title III carved out an exemption for wiretapping performed in the pursuit of foreign intelligence gathering.385 It did not limit
the constitutional power of the President to "obtain[ing] foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States,
or to protect[ing] national security information against foreign intelligence activities.",386 Restrictions on the executive's use at trial of information obtained pursuant to this section provided additional privacy protection. The government could use the information only if the "interception was reasonable," and it could not otherwise disclose the information
except as necessary for the executive to implement his power to protect
the nation.387
Over the years, Congress added three additional sections, 2511,
2515, and 2520, to provide remedies for violations of Title III. These
sections provided for criminal sanctions, 388 injunctive relief,389 Civil
remedies, 39 and the right to exclude the contents of the illegally obtained
377. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 263.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See Berger,388 U.S. at 58-63.
381. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, § 802, 82 Stat.
197,263.
382. But see discussion on Carnivore, supra note 240.
383. See Berger,388 U.S. at 69 (Stewart, J., concurring).
384. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 ("surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate. ... clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government
asserts in fact took place").
385. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
197, 257. This exemption has particular significance to some of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (2000).

389.
390.

Id. §2511(5).
Id. § 2520.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Wo|). 80:2

communications from evidence. 391 According to the U.S. Attorney statistics, these remedies have not hindered the government's surveillance
ability.39 2
H. Expansion of Government Ability to Intercept Communication Under
FISA
Title III provided several layers of privacy protection to the individual because of the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance. Before the
PATRIOT Act, FISA did not significantly deter government surveillance
if the information sought fell under the heading of foreign intelligence.
The PATRIOT Act's amendments to FISA weaken even those restrictions.
FISA required the government to certify that the targeted communication came from an individual engaging in international terrorism or an
agent of a foreign power. 393 Section 214 of the PATRIOT Act eliminates
this requirement.39 This means that the government could justify surveillance with a pen register/trap and trace device by alleging that it intended
to use the device in "any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information, 39 5 a much more lax standard. This circumvents FISA's limited protection against governmental intrusions and undercuts the reasons
for a lowered standard for governmental surveillance.396 This amendment
allows the government to perform searches for customary purposes, but
without the protection of the probable cause requirement in regular
criminal investigations.
I. Multi Point (Roving Wiretap)Authority
Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA to include "roving"
wiretap authority. Roving wiretaps for domestic criminal law investigations require third parties "'specified in court-ordered surveillance' to
provide assistance ...to accomplish the surveillance" on a communica-

391. Id. § 2515. This section codifies the Olmstead exclusionary rule. See Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 468, overruledin part by Berger, 388 U.S. 41 and Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
392. As stated by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Olmstead, "[I]t [is] a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." See Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
393. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3) (2000).
394. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214, 115 Stat. 272, 286.
395. Id.
396. Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorismlfisa/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) [hereinafter EPIC FISA].
That laxity is premised on the assumption Congress and the courts should not unduly
restrain the Executive branch, in pursuit of its national security responsibilities to monitor
the activities of foreign powers and their agents. The removal of the "foreign power"
predicate for pen register/trap and trace surveillance upsets that delicate balance.
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tion as it moves through a succession of carriers and devices, i.e.,
roves. 397 Pursuant to section 206 of the PATRIOT Act, the FISA roving
wiretap order need not identify the third party if the "[c]ourt finds that
the actions of the target ... may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified person. 398 The proposed change would extend the
obligation to assist the government "to unnamed and unspecified third
parties., 399 Upon the discovery of a new carrier, the government would
present it with a generic wiretap order and "effect FISA coverage as soon
as technically feasible. ' '4° The PATRIOT Act has very little of the protections afforded under Title III.
The PATRIOT Act particularly threatens the privacy of individuals
who access the Internet through public facilities, such as libraries and
university computer labs. 40 1 "Upon the suspicion that an intelligence target might use such a facility, the FBI [could] ...monitor all communications transmitted at the facility. ''4 2 There exists a high probability that
the government could intercept "the private communications of lawabiding . . .citizens" since "the recipient of the assistance order .. .
would be prohibited from disclosing the fact that monitoring is occurring. 4 °3
CONCLUSION

Surveillance technology will invariably advance and terrorists will
invariably use those advancements. No one would suggest that the government should not use the most current technology to prevent tragedy.
However, protection does not mean that we should abandon traditional
notions of privacy. As a society, we may choose to cede more of our civil
liberties so as to prevent another 9/11, but we should not make this decision lightly or without fully understanding what we put at risk.
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment to cover both physical and nonphysical governmental intrusions, the courts balanced the government's
need to search purportedly private areas with the individual's need to
prevent government intrusion. 4°4 The complex system of safeguards de397.
398.

See EPIC, supranote 207.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282.

399.
400.

EPIC, supra note 207.
Id.

401.

See EPIC FISA, supra note 396.

402.

See id.

403.

See id.

404. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that sense-enhancing
surveillance technology intrudes upon minimum expectation of privacy protected under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (placing unmonitored surveillance device
to track use of drug extracting equipment did not violate Fourth Amendment because itdid not
intrude on reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding
that defendant justifiably relied on privacy of public telephone booth and that it would be free from
unwarranted electronic surveillance by government); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
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veloped to support the Fourth Amendment provides evidence of the nation's resolve to maintain that balance. Judicial oversight balanced the
needs of the government with the privacy interests of citizens by enforcing the requirement for warrants and by assessing the reasonableness of
searches performed. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 established the procedural guidelines for the use of
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by law enforcement agencies.4 °5 Exclusionary rules created an incentive for law enforcement officials to obey these constraints by precluding the suppression of evidence
properly obtained through the use of warrants.40 6 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act gave procedures for obtaining access to stored
electronic communications (e-mail). 4°7
Removal of the checks and balances on governmental action by the
PATRIOT Act could diminish the already waning protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. By increasing the scope of information subject
to government access and reducing the independent judicial review of the
government's actions, the PATRIOT Act lowered the threshold for legitimate governmental intrusion into the individual's privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.
[I]f the government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation or [sic] privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects .... In
such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations
had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in4 8ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
amendment protection was. 0
Without Congressional oversight, the PATRIOT Act could render the
Fourth Amendment impotent as a guardian of civil liberty in domestic
criminal law investigations. In the words of Ben Franklin, one of the

(holding that the government must show probable cause to seize vehicles for transport of liquor in
the absence of a warrant to protect motorist's freedom from seizure under Fourth Amendment).
405. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)). The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amended Title III by including such electronic
communications as digitally transmitted conversations, electronic mail, cellular telephones and pen
registers. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
406. FED. R. CRN. P. 41.
407. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. IV 1987).
408. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
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founding fathers of this nation, "They that can give up essential liberty to
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." 4°9

409.

Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR

QUOTATIONS 310 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).

